


# *The* **I**ndonesian **Q**uarterly

OCTOBER 1977



VOL. V,

**4**

CENTRE FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES



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
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The Indonesian Quarterly is a medium for the views, research findings and evaluations of scholars, statesmen and creative thinkers in both national and international forum on Indonesia and other related issues, to promote better understanding of the current Indonesian situation and its problems.

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PRIVATE UNIVERSITIES IN THE SYSTEM OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN INDONESIA <i>S. HARTO</i>	5
INTRODUCING KKN: INDONESIA'S NATIONAL STUDY SERVICE SCHEME <i>M. Soenardi DJIWANDONO</i>	19
PANCASILA DEMOCRACY <i>MASHURI</i>	32
ENERGY PERSPECTIVES OF THE THIRD WORLD <i>Sumitro DJOJOHADIKUSUMO</i>	44
THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS AND DOMESTIC CONSIDERATIONS OF DEEP SEABED MINING <i>John M. MURPHY</i>	56
THE UNITED STATES, JAPAN AND ASIAN SECURITY <i>Franklin B. WEINSTEIN</i>	66
CHRONICLES	86

## FROM THE EDITOR

*Higher education in Indonesia is a decisive factor to step up people's welfare and the country development as a whole. It cannot be denied that the role of private higher education is important in addition to the state-run institution of higher learning. For that reason, S. Harto in his article "Private Universities in the System of Higher Education in Indonesia" wrote that the great differences in the level of development between state-run and private-run universities will create social problems. Endeavors are therefore needed and this calls for cooperation and participation of the private sector and the support of the government to close the wide gap between state-run and private-run universities.*

*Still related to higher education is M. Soenardi Djiwandono's article on the "Indonesia's National Study Service Scheme" known as the Kuliah Kerja Nyata (KKN). He shows the importance of this study scheme for the students as well as the university alike. Thus, the KKN provides the student with a first hand experience of the societal environment which is important for their understanding once they graduate. Whilst for the university, the KKN forms the feedback essential for the relevancy of its program to enhance this social service scheme further for the benefit of the society.*

*Mr. Mashuri's article concerns his idea of democracy in Indonesia known as "Pancasila Democracy". According to him a political system which emerges in a particular country or society is a projection of the value rooted in the culture of that society into the field of politics. Accordingly, Pancasila Democracy should take values which are rooted in Indonesia as a starting point.*

*The Minister of Research, Sumitro Djojohadikusumo forwarded in his article "Energy Perspectives of the Third World". According to him, future perspective of energy will provide a contour of our global system in transformation which entails in structural changes and permanent shift in political and economic parameters. The Third World will be deeply affected. For the resource-owning among the developing countries, will provide an opportunity for expanded export capacity, higher tax ratios and improve development performance with diversification of the economy. But for the resource-poor countries it will pose the specter of stagnation and deterioration, unless the international system would enable policy management to cope with the riddles and dilemmas inherent in future trend.*

*U.S. Congressman John M. Murphy discusses "The International Dimensions and Domestic Considerations of Deep Seabed Mining". Accord-*



ding to him, deep seabed mining in the Eastern Pacific Ocean, the South Pacific near Polynesia, or in the Indian Ocean, is a critical issue for the whole world. The problem is not the scarcity of the resources of the deep seabed nor is it the scarcity of knowledge and technical capability to recover them, but the equal distribution in the benefits of deep seabed mining to nations, in accordance with the commitment and investment of resources on their part. One should not be lead to think that deep seabed mining is an initiative being fostered by the United States alone, they are however, trying to establish their rights in the ocean, pursuing a policy that accounts for human welfare. Therefore, "it is an imperative that the exploration and development of the oceans be strongly encouraged by the world community — and not be politically constrained by an international conference which may be based on questionable premises and irreconcilable position".

Franklin B. Weinstein's article "The United States, Japan and Asian Security" discusses the interplay of interest of the major powers such as the United States, Japan, Korea, Soviet Union and its implication for Asian Security.

## ERRATA

- page 5, the first line of paragraph 1 :  
One may say that the history of *higher education* .....  
should be ..... One may say that the history of *private universities* .....
- page 9, the third line from the bottom :  
..... a trial and error *progress*. should be  
..... a trial and error *process*.
- page 9 the second line from the bottom :  
..... of this *progress* ..... should be  
..... of this *process* .....
- page 82 the first line of paragraph 2 :  
The second *falacy* ..... should be  
The second *fallacy* .....
- page 91 the sixth line :  
He said *furhter* ..... should be  
He said *further* .....

# PRIVATE UNIVERSITIES IN THE SYSTEM OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN INDONESIA

S. HARTO

## INTRODUCTION

One may say that the history of higher education in Indonesia is as old as the Republic of Indonesia. Since the first years of the independence, higher institutions of learning have been established as efforts to step up and improve education in general.

In almost all aspects of the life of this nation, this backwardness after three centuries of colonization, has resulted in the strivance for a national independence — one that will create social and spiritual welfare.

Education is seen as a strategic factor in the realization of the people's welfare. It has therefore been realized from the outset that the field of education should be dealt with much seriousness, and should be developed in the framework of a well-aimed and organized national system.

The task of the government is to organize and make guidelines in the national educational system; making various regulations and policies based on the existing laws. But it is not solely the monopoly of the government to organize education. Pancasila (the five principles) which is the state's philosophy and the nation's way of life, does not basically adhere to etatism. This means that private sectors may participate in almost all endeavours in the effort to achieve the national aim. The establishing of schools of all levels of education has to be attributed to the private sectors. Their role and significance, however, should not be disregarded especially where elementary and secondary level of education is concerned. Ever

since the colonial days, people have gained confidence in private schools and their existence has been well received, because they believe that the private institutions are able to run reliable and high standard schools.

It has to be admitted, however, that private higher institutions of learning has not reached an equally high and significant standard as that of elementary and secondary schools. The reasons for this will be further elaborated. In fact since 1969, intensive national development has been carried out through the Repelita (Five Years Development Plan) and now with the continuation of it through the Repelita II, much contribution from both state-run and private universities is required in the field of higher education.

## THE NEED FOR DEVELOPMENT

Although private colleges have been established since the early years of Indonesia's Independence most of them are still incapable of growing; only a small number of them have gained recognition as qualified universities. Out of the 350 private universities in Indonesia, only 10% in 1976 merited recognition.<sup>1</sup> If we compare the development of the 40 state-run universities to the development of the private ones, a substantial difference can be noted as follows: The 'A' group, which are the universities with the highest level of development, consists of 9 universities or 22,5%.

The 'B' group : 13 universities or 32,5%.

The 'C' group : 18 universities or 45%.<sup>2</sup>

The fact that there is a difference in the level of development between the state-run universities and the private ones, is commonly understood especially for a developing country like Indonesia. But too wide a difference is unfavourable for it would create social problems; endeavours are needed to improve the condition. The government should support the development of private universities but this effort can only be productive if the private universities themselves cooperate by giving positive

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1 Explanation given by the Directorate General of Private Higher Institutions, of Learning, Department of Culture and Education, *Kompas*, December 24, 1976

2 Concluded from: "Gambaran Keadaan Pendidikan Tinggi Indonesia 1975" (Illustration of the 1975 Indonesia's Higher Educational Institutions), Directorate General of Higher Education, Department of Culture and Education, 1976.



response to the government's policy. Since education is the responsibility of both the government and the society at large, participation of the society should be stepped up.

The total number of private universities in Indonesia today (1977) is 334, including universities, institutes, colleges and academies (compare with the 40 state-run universities)<sup>3</sup> with a student population of 120.000 or 80% of the whole student population. From this evaluation we may speculate quantitatively that the private universities have greater potential in contributing towards the development of higher education in Indonesia and in national development, in general.

The development of the potentials of private universities is becoming more important in the future (both in the long and short run). We can see from collected data that admittance into universities increases from year to year. It indicates that the state-run universities alone cannot meet the growing demand of students admittance. In 1975 a total of 82.000 students registered into state-run universities but only 26.000 (approximately 30%) were accepted. 40% of the remaining students entered private universities. There is no exact data on the rest.

The government is facing an immense problem, not only in higher education but also in elementary and secondary level. Their main problem is providing proper education to all children between the ages of 6-19. This is a real challenge and can only be overcome through planning and incrementally executed.

According to the census of 1971 the school attendance rate for the 7-13 age population group (i.e. that age group which should be attending SD or primary school) was 0.55; the rate for the 14-16 age group (i.e. that age group which should be attending SMP or Junior High School) was only 0.29. For the 17-19 age group (i.e. that age group which should be attending SMA or Senior High School the rate was even lower. By the year 2000 the rate should steadily become 1,00 for the SD group, 0.80 for the SMP group and 0.60 for the SMA group.

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3 Consisting of: 27 universities, 10 IKIP (Institute of Teacher Training and Education), 2 Institutes of Technology and 1 Institute of Agriculture.

University and college education should be developed in such a way that the top ten per cent of SMA graduates may easily obtained entrances into higher institutions of learning.<sup>4</sup>

From the above illustration it is now clear that private higher institutions of learning should be considered as a potential in the framework of national educational development strategy (both in the long and short run strategy), supporting the development efforts of the country.

This means that private education which includes private universities should be cultivated and developed in the more active and positive manner so that an adequate level of development (more or less equal to that of state-run educational institutes) can be attained. If the development of private education is a success then the society will be provided with more opportunities in education.

## HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The history of higher education in Indonesia in this modern age is in fact relatively young compared to that of the developed countries in particular.

Not until 1910 did the Dutch colonial government consider developing a programme on higher education which was undoubtedly that of a 'Western' conception. This conception came into being only in the interests of the colonial government, for there was a rising demand for professionals from Europe and difficulty in obtaining them. Moreover, they wanted to stabilize the Dutch culture among the Indonesians who experienced their planned system of higher education.

The realization of this programme came ten years later, with the establishment of the college of engineering in Bandung in 1920, which has become one of the most wellknown colleges in Indonesia. Since 1959 it has been known as ITB (Bandung Institute of Technology).

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4 Sumitro Djojohadikusumo: *Science, Resources and Development*, LP3ES, Jakarta 1977, Chapter VII, *Indonesia Towards the Year 2000*, p. 106.

As evolution of the programme took place, more colleges were set up (between the years 1924-1941) mainly to produce professionals in the fields of public service, agriculture and horticulture. The respective colleges set up were as follows:

- in 1924: College of Law (RHS) in Jakarta
- in 1927: College of Medicine in Jakarta
- in 1940: College of Letters in Jakarta  
School of Medicine and Dentistry in Surabaya
- in 1941: The first year (propadeuse) initiated for higher education in Agriculture in Bogor, (attached to the College of Medicine in Jakarta).

There were no alterations in the field of education until the end of the Dutch colonization, which was marked by the invasion of the Japanese Occupation Army in Indonesia in March 1942. At the time the Indonesian students formed a minority for priority was given to the Dutch and Europeans in general, in the enrollment into higher institutions of learning. Between the period of 1920-1945, the number of students in Indonesia totaled 3,242, among which 1,489 or 45.9% were Indonesians.

Once the Indonesian people won their independence in 1945, a legacy in the realm of education with the following characteristics was left to them:

- a. A small number of higher institutions of learning (not more than six) centred in Java, respectively in Jakarta, Bandung, Bogor and Surabaya.
- b. A Western orientated (particularly Dutch) system of education.
- c. A system of higher education which consisted of independent colleges for there were no faculties (with respective units of sciences) that made up a university as a whole.

Using this situation as a “capital” and with the limited experience in the field of education, Indonesia was to develop her system of education on a national scale in order to meet the demands and wishes of this era and the society. This has to be initiated from a socio-economic and political situation which is far from stable so that one may comment that higher education in Indonesia was built up through a trial and error progress. The impact of this progress is felt years later, especially by the private sector of higher education.



During 1946-1947, efforts to set up higher institutions of learning on a national scale were made by a group of intellectuals (who were pioneers complying with the need of higher education) in the strivance for an advanced and prosperous nation. They even went to the extent of establishing institutions themselves although the government had not yet initiated anything in that field.

The government then took over these private institutions of learning and transformed them into state-run universities. To cite a number of them: the University of Gajah Mada in Yogyakarta, which was taken over in 1949, the University of Indonesia in Jakarta, taken over in 1950, Airlangga University in Surabaya, in 1954, Andalas University in Padang in 1956 and the University of North Sumatra in Medan in 1957. Till 1964, a total of 14 private higher institutions of learning were taken over by the government.<sup>5</sup>

Today, there are still a great number of private universities and more seem to be coming up each year.

On the one hand, the augmentation of the number of private universities may be considered as a natural development process in the light of the rising demand of entrances into universities by SMA graduates. The drive of society especially the youth to obtain a higher level of education has become greater after the second world war, which was marked by the progress of science and technology. History has told us that before Indonesia won her independence, opportunities for the native people in obtaining a higher level of education was very limited.

On the other hand the momentum of the increasing number of private universities between the period 1960-1965, has created a problem of its own in the field of education for it does not coincide with the steps made to upgrade the quality of education. This is due to the lack of direction and guidance from the part of both the government and private universities.

The impact of the unstable economic and socio-political conditions, since the proclamation of Indonesia's independence in 1945, has hindered the government's administration from tackling the problem of education in a thorough and consistent manner.

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5 The Book Committee of "20 Tahun Indonesia Merdeka"; *20 Tahun Indonesia Merdeka*, Book VIII, pp. 309-310



Meanwhile, the private universities are giving the unhealthy impression of being set up without undergoing the necessary procedures and without even having minimum educational facilities.

Considering the grave national economic situation at that time, we cannot expect to obtain all the technical facilities. Nevertheless, minimum requirements should have at least been obtained since the outset of the establishment of the institutions. Even, if the minimum requirements are not in access, it would then be advisable to abandon the idea of setting up a university or, postponing it. But this did not happen. We cannot overlook the fact that private institutions were set up in this manner. The government worked on this matter as revealed to us in the Basic Memorandum of the Director General of Higher Education of 1967. The Director General of Higher Education stated in its decision letter no. 162 and 164 that the objective and minimum requirements for both private and state-run universities will be provided.

Apparently other motivating factors in a negative sense, have affected the growth process of the private universities.

The most noticeable motivation that prompted the intellectuals to set up national oriented universities was "patriotism". In the light of the socio-political situation at that time, it is quite understandable that patriotism was the pushing power and played a deciding role in other aspects of their undertakings. But in the course of further development, other motivations stepped in that were basically incompatible with the field of education, such as political, personal, group prestige and commercial motivations.

## THE SOCIO-POLITICAL SITUATION AND ITS INFLUENCE

Due to the socio-political situation in Indonesia in the past particularly in the sixties (1959-1965), the emergence of these motivations were inevitable. Rivalries and conflicts occurred among political and social powers were fighting for influence over the state and on the society in general. Political groups and other social forces are after the field of higher education which is generally still reserved for the elites of Indonesia and is potentially of great influence over the society at large. In one way or another,

they are trying to dominate this field in the effort of stabilizing the strategic political struggle. It can be said that within certain limits they have succeeded either by implanting their influence on certain elements of the "civitas academica" (academic members) of both private and state-run universities or, by setting up private universities. This is possible because so many extra curricular student organizations, lecturers and personnel are affiliated to certain political groupings and if such an organization is able to develop higher institutions of learning, it will form "pressure groups" on campus. Establishing a university is relatively easy. Despite the enforcement of Law no. 22 of 1961 which stipulated the necessary requirements for setting up a university, its implementation did not have much effect, for weaknesses within the government apparatus impeded its proper implementation. The government is often compelled to face a "fait accompli" when private universities are set up without any notification and are thus not registered in the Department of Culture and Education.

This explains why adequate data on private universities could only be obtained since the past three years, especially after the formation of the Directorate General of Private Higher Education in 1945, in the restructuring of all departments including the Department of Culture and Education.

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AN EXAMPLE OF THE QUOTED DATA IS AS FOLLOWS:

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Number of Private Universities

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Source	Year	Total
The Book Committee of "20 Tahun Indonesia Merdeka" (20 years of Indonesian Independence) <sup>6</sup>	1965	202
The Team of the 1967 University Statistics <sup>7</sup>	1967	124 (only those of "registered" and "equal" status)
The Directorate of Private Higher Education <sup>8</sup>	1976/77	334

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6 "20 Tahun Indonesia Merdeka" Book VIII, *Ibid.*, p. 226

7 Report of the Team of University Statistics of 1967, p. 9

8 Directorate General of Private Higher Institutions of Learning: The 1976/1977 tentative Report of the Implementation of the Private Higher Institutions of Learning Development Programme.

This inability of obtaining reliable data on private universities was also caused by the inefficiency of the administrative apparatus of the government itself. Hence any writing on private universities were based on weak assumptions.

Data of 1976/77 from the Directorate General of Private Higher Institutions of Learning are considered most accurate: owing to the better organization and administration of the Department of Culture and Education.

The rise of the number of private universities set up during the period of 1965 to 1975 which came to a total of 131 or 6.5%, was unlikely. Since revelations of some facts indicated as follows:

- a. After the abortive Communist coup of the September 30th Movement or Gestapu Movement the several private universities who were affiliated to the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) were either banned or, dissolved.
- b. Since 1967 the government's new policy as contained in (the 1967 Basic Memorandum and Letter of Decision No. 164/1967) has limited the setting up of private universities.

From these revelations we may draw the conclusion that the data of 1965 is incorrect and that the number estimated exceeds 202 (figure stated earlier).

It is difficult for us to compare data of 1967 obtained by the Team of Statistics of Universities for the 124 private universities mentioned were "registered" universities (i.e. universities that give state examination) and "equalized" universities (one that give their own examinations) while "incredited" universities (ones that give their own examinations under the supervision of the government) were not included. With respect to the limited data on private universities the team reported, among other things that collected data on private and governmental training institutions only make up respectively 15 percent and 25 percent. Hence there is difficulty in making a statistic table. Several attempts however have been made to make an estimate on the whole of Indonesia using the data mentioned. Due to the limited data on private universities and training institutions, this estimate only refers to state-run universities/institutions.<sup>9</sup> These facts have shown that for a relatively long

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9 Report of the Team of University Statistics of 1967, op. cit., p. 1



time the private institutions have grown exactly in that manner, almost without any directives, guidance and supervision. People are well aware of their existence but are ignorant of the problems they undergo.

Under the circumstances, all shortcomings or defects that still prevail in the field of private higher education are essentially the shortcomings of the national system of higher education and are the results of the past development process. The defects cannot be attributed only to the private universities but also, to the past government. All this can be traced back to the unfavourable socio-economic and political situation and conditions experienced for a relatively long period of time by the Indonesian state and government.

Therefore efforts in guiding and developing private universities are now being launched systematically and should be based on a realistic and fair attitude from all parties concerned, particularly the government, instructional bodies and the administration of private universities. All of them should be towards the one goal of developing the potential of private universities and to attain a reliable standard in the national system of higher education.

## THE CREDIBILITY FACTOR

The process of growth and development of private universities which has been practically without an aim or guidance or supervision for a relatively long time, may be the explanation of their unsatisfactory condition till present. One of the weaknesses which may have had a widespread effect is the so-called "crisis of credibility" vis-a-vis private universities, in general, in the society at large. This is obvious judging from the deteriorating credibility of graduates from private universities and the reluctance on the part of High School graduates to enter into private universities. The society itself lacks confidence in private universities. This attitude is understandable because the society expects the best; apart from safety and security. Such an attitude is also understandable in the light of the traditional cultural background and mental attitude which prevails within the society since the days of colonization and prior to that, when people were more oriented towards bureaucracy than to private enterprises.



This was among other things mirrored in the outcome of a survey on various kinds of jobs preferred by students from private universities, in 1976. It indicated that 64% of the students opted for civil servant offices, while only 13% wanted to start businesses of their own and the remaining 23% wanted to work in private enterprises. 51% to 52% out of the 64% hoped to obtain jobs in which they were qualified in-while the other 56% would be satisfied with any kind of work involved with the government.<sup>10</sup>

In fact the chances for graduates from private universities getting jobs as civil servants are very small, for government authorities give priority to graduates from state-run universities. Hence the lack of social credibility vis-a-vis private universities can be partly accredited to the government's policy.

It has to be admitted however, that this lack of credibility vis-a-vis private universities is not objectively unfounded. From the 300 private universities mentioned earlier, only 10% of the total number are well-reputed. A substantial part has not yet reached the appropriate level of development, another part does not show any significant growth and is in fact still on the level of subsistence. There is still a limited number of fulltime lecturers, a small and limited space of building, restricted facilities, a small collection of books in the libraries and the lack of other facilities which is the general illustration of most private universities. There is also a suspicion that management in this field is slack since there is no sign of significant growth.<sup>11</sup>

Thus the fostering of instruction and its development can be based on the above mentioned lack of credibility as a starting point because from this fact a relationship between diverse elements and factors, that are both casual and interdependent in nature, can be traced back. This kind of approach is based on the assumption that the issues concerning private universities cannot be separated from other factors. They should be tackled comprehensively and integratedly.

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10 Soekisno, Director General of Private Higher Institutions of Education, on the "Dies Natalis" of UNISBA (Islamic University of Bandung) in April 1976, *Kompas*, April 6, 1976.

11 Tentative report of the Implementation of the Private Higher Educational Institution Development Programme of 1976/1977, *op.cit.*, p. 3.

From the diagnosis of the Directorate General of Private Higher Institutions mentioned above, it can thus be concluded that the flaw is generally due to the lack of material and facilities in addition to management. Hence it is understandable that efforts should be directed towards the stepping up of the facilities and the feasibility of fostering them. But this is insufficient if there is no support, endeavours and others policies to promote the status and position of private universities on a national scale.

Measures to enable the smooth process of graduating is an important factor that influences the credibility of the private universities. If this process is hampered it would mean a waste of time and money for the students concerned and is indirectly detrimental to the society.

The determinant obstacle of growth is the lack of education facilities as mentioned above. But besides this, we cannot ignore the role of the institutions and the government's policy that hinder the process of growth. The governments policy of supervision vis-a-vis private universities also implies supervision in their quality. A kind of quality control should be exercised for the interests of the people. Moreover, judging from the history of private universities, a form of "screening" and "order" is necessary.

But this control should be conducted in such a way as not to disrupt the growth and development of private universities. Any policy with the tendency of becoming less objective, discriminating in any way or excessive by bureaucracy, should be avoided so as to allow proper growth and development of private universities.

It seems important to specify the minimum requirements that should be implemented within specific length of time under circumstances that are conducive to the implementation of growth. Once the above mentioned factors are considered, then the enforcement of the requirements will be feasible.

In this context it can be noted that the failure of the aforementioned 1967 Policy was most likely due to negligence of carrying out of the above factors.<sup>12</sup>

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12 The minimum requirements for the development of Private universities was set in the letter of decision of the Director General of Higher Educational Institutions No. 164, 1967, but could not be implemented within a specific length of time, and the government seemed to be impotent to enforce it.



The role of the government in the growth and development of private universities has become more significant. The government should give directives that are parallel to the development strategy of national higher education within the framework of the national development strategy. In this connection, both government and private universities should be aware that the present unsatisfactory condition is due to the improper growth process. And accordingly these guidelines do not only encompass the minimum requirements, but then includes other aspects as well, such as administrative reform of the government itself, improvement of private higher education; control which within a certain extent can be considered a reform and perhaps providing certain aids that the private sector is still incapable of obtaining by themselves. In consequence this calls for political will from the government, its duty and authority to develop the private sector, in addition to the need for political courage.

## CONCLUSION

Private universities are a living reality in society. Their right to exist is guaranteed by the Constitution and further spelled out in the Law on Higher Educational Institutions, i.e. the Law No. 22, 1961. Article 31 paragraph (1) of the Constitution that quotes: "Every citizen has the right to an education" as implied in the idea of democracy that every citizen has the right to choose his own education according with his aspirations. The consequence of this principle is that the private sector has the right to organize non-governmental education which can become an alternative for everyone concerned.

This is clearly spelled out in Law No. 22, 1961 on Higher Education, particularly in article 3 and 22, Article 3 that quotes: "Higher Education is to be fostered by: (a) The government; (b) Private Legal Body". At the same time Article 22 quotes "This law recognizes the right of every citizen to set up a private university".

Thus the legal status of private universities in Indonesia is quite apparent. It constitutes the integral part and subsystem of the national higher education system. And in its relation to the state-run universities, both are supplementary and complementary to each other. Both are partners with the same mission of dedication

to the nation and humanity through academic activities. It would be a mistake to consider the private universities as "rivals" of the state-run universities. Even taking á priori stand to private universities on account of unfounded facts can be regarded as unjust and gives the impression of irresponsibility.

These ideal principles should be forwarded again in the context of ideas on the issues on development of private universities in Indonesia which are essentially issues on the system of national higher education as a whole. Development in the academic-technical sense can be guaranteed and achieved through the stepping up of the necessary educational facilities, while at the same time the right orientation of development can only be guaranteed if those efforts are based on the ideal principles and reflected in every policy of the decision makers.



# INTRODUCING KKN: INDONESIA'S NATIONAL STUDY SERVICE SCHEME

M. Soenardi DJIWANDONO

## INTRODUCTION

For the last few years, a study service scheme commonly known as KKN, has been conducted by universities throughout Indonesia, especially government universities. Through the scheme thousands of university students have been assigned to live in rural areas, in villages, and to work among the villagers for a couple of months prior to their graduation from their respective universities. In these villages, where approximately 80% of the 130 million population still live in a relatively very simple way, the students as the country's privileged future leaders are exposed to the real living realities of the people with their enormous demands and countless number of problems.

KKN was initiated as an educational scheme back in the year 1971, and was conducted for the first time in three government universities: Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta, Hasanuddin University in Ujung Pandang and Andalas University in Padang. Only 40 students took part in that first scheme. The number of participating universities and students, however, has been steadily increasing since then. From three universities in 1971, the number rose to 13 in 1973, became 15 in 1974, 29 in 1975 and it ultimately reached its maximum number of all 40 government universities in the year 1976. In that year, as many as 4025 students were involved. In addition, several private universities and institutes as well as those belonging to departments other than Department of Education, are beginning to follow suit.

The preparation, management and supervision of thousands of students for their work in villages through KKN, requires full par-

ticipation on the part of the universities. Students who are willing and suitable for the scheme have to be selected and recruited. Curriculum has to be adjusted. Lectures and practical exercises have to be conducted. Lecturers and supervisors have to be assigned. In short, for universities, KKN has become an educational scheme which, at times, may be very demanding. One may, therefore, wonder what implications KKN has made on education in general. In addition, one may also wonder whether the villages and the village people can really benefit from it. This article is written with the primary purpose of presenting an outline introduction of the scheme, followed by brief accounts of some of its implications on education.

## THE BACKGROUND

As a relatively young developing country, Indonesia is confronted with thousands of problems in its efforts to develop itself. It is a vast island country of more than 3000 islands. With more than 130 million inhabitants, most of whom live in underprivileged conditions in remote often backward rural areas, it is one of the countries in the world with the biggest number of population. In these places, skilled and educated manpower is scarce. Employment is rare. Consequently, competent labors and good leaders badly needed for development are not easily available. Life is generally hard. Mental attitudes and social, traditional rules may often make life even more difficult. The whole condition is far from conducive for national, regional or sometimes even local development. So the villages which were underdeveloped in the first place, may be lagging further behind in the national development, unless some concrete steps are taken to narrow down, if not bridge, the gap between the development in the urban and the rural areas.

Unlike villages and their less fortunate villagers, universities have many of the means the rural areas are usually deprived of. They have the brains, the skills and other intellectual and academic facilities necessary for the acceleration of the national development. It is only natural, therefore, along with other members of the society, university society members should take more active parts and play better roles in the overall development including the

rural development, which should not be neglected if the entire development plan is to be successful.

Experiments and studies have been conducted in different fields to formulate innovative concepts and ideas which will suit the specific demands of national development. Practical trainings have been organized for those working in a variety of jobs. Professors have even been appointed cabinet ministers and members of other decision making bodies in the government. And above all, students and teaching staff members, through their curricular as well as extra-curricular activities, have been engaged in social service schemes such as PTM (Pengerahan Tenaga Mahasiswa or University Students Requitment Program) by which students are assigned, temporarily, to teach to help overcome shortage of teachers, Bimas (Bimbingan Masal or Mass Guidance) to upgrade and update the peasants' ways of farming, the volunteer service organized through BUTSI (Badan Urusan Tenaga Sukarela or Board for Volunteer Service) and many other social programs more incidental and local in nature.

And yet in spite of all those efforts that Indonesian universities have made and the roles they have assumed in their participation in the national development programs, the problems are still there to be solved and the demands for more services are even greater. More contribution from universities is again called for. With all the experiences obtained through PTM, Bimas, BUTSI etc., a formulation was made by which the universities will serve the society especially in the rural areas, this time in a much bigger scale in terms of philosophy, ambitions, manpower and financial back-up. This is how the basic idea of KKN was conceived and developed to its present form.

## THE OBJECTIVES

KKN should be interpreted as K (Kuliah or lectures, curricular program) and KN (Kerja Nyata or real, concrete work) instead of the often misleading interpretation of its as KK (Kuliah Kerja or study trip, field trip) which is N (Nyata or real), with the implication that there may be un-Real Study Trip. The equivalent free translation of KKN may therefore be something like University (Students) Curricular Community Service or, as it is officially



known, Indonesia's National Study Service Scheme. As such it involves at least three essential components in its realization: the students, the university and the community. The objectives of KKN can then be identified from the point of view of each of those components.

When Indonesian university students graduate, they are expected to be soon capable of assuming proper responsibilities in the society which has a big demand for educated people for its complex development programs. This requires that the young graduates should be fully aware of the concrete problems their people face in their search for better lives, and they should also be prepared and sufficiently equipped to take active parts, competently, in the process of national development. KKN is intended as part of the means to provide the students with the necessary first hand experience and impressions of the lives of their fellow countrymen in the villages in their struggle to catch up with the accelerating national development. Through KKN students also get the opportunity to apply for themselves what they have learned in the university in their own respective fields and as part of interdisciplinary application of different fields.

For the university, too, KKN serves its purpose in the form of feedback essential for the relevance of its programs. The preparation of the students and lecturer-supervisors requires that the university should have enough knowledge of what is really needed in the villages in the form of skills, knowledge, methods, tools etc. Direct and frequent contacts with the people and their affairs in rural areas will give the university hints as to what curricular aspects should be modified, reduced or introduced to give better services to the society through better preparation of the graduates. The university and the society then are to be brought closer to each other.

But most of all KKN should be useful for the development of the rural areas. Careful consideration should be taken in the selection of student-participants, the lecturer-supervisors, the courses and trainings for their preparation, the kinds of village development projects and even the methods and approaches to carry out whatever is to be done by KKN students. The rural areas should not become a mere testing and experimental ground for theoretical knowledge or adventurism of the university member.



On the contrary, KKN should try hard to support and assist the village people to participate in the development and to enjoy its merits. If not in the form of concrete material projects, KKN should at least produce cadres and train local people to keep and continue what is to be done for development and what has been done during KKN period. This is how KKN can be of significant importance for the society and the government in the realization of the national development programs.

## THE STATUS IN CURRICULUM

The above objectives of KKN are in full accordance with "tri dharma perguruan tinggi" (the threefold mission of Indonesian universities) required by 1961 Law on Higher Education of all universities: education, research and social service. The academic programs of KKN like lectures on practical knowledge, on the-job-trainings, tests and papers, supervision and evaluation, are the realization and reflection of the first mission: educational responsibility. The 3-to-6 month period when the students work in the village which forms the main portion of KKN, is without a doubt the concrete application of the university's responsibility in conducting social service. While the second mission, research, though not impossible to be conducted through KKN, is not expected to be part of it.

KKN with its social and educational background and its far reaching objectives, is a serious business for the university and for the government. As a project it is part of REPELITA II (the second Five Year Development Plan) outlined in Chapter 22 by not less than the MPR (People's National Assembly) in 1973. In the national development plan it is stated that KKN is a curricular program for university students, by which students of interdisciplinary studies are placed in villages for a certain period of time. The Department of Education which, in coordination with other government departments, is in charge of the project, specifies further that KKN is to be included in the curriculum as a compulsory program for the students. This is in line with the observation of the great urgent demand of the rural areas for services of the university's educated population with their potentials which they are assumed to possess.

The application of this principle of compulsory, curricular nature of KKN at its present stage of development, however, still varies. This is due to the differences in the actual conditions and capacities of the individual universities and also other regional or local variables. Some universities, such as Hasanuddin and Sriwijaya, find it feasible to organize KKN as required for all graduate students before graduating. In some universities, on the other hand, KKN is an entirely volunteer program. Only those who are willing to join will take part in KKN, with or without credits. Only few universities, among other IKIP Malang, treats KKN as an elective curricular program. In this system the students are free to include (or not to include) KKN in their study program just as they are free to take (or not to take) other subjects of the same category: elective. Once KKN is included into a student's curricular program, it will be organized in much the same way as any other courses comprising lectures, exercises, tests, and of course working in the village as a specifically KKN program, and finally, grade and credits given through the student's supervisor. Other students who do not join KKN, take other elective subjects.

Admittedly the curricular status of KKN is dependent upon the educational and curricular system applied in the individual universities which, at their present situation, are not (yet) organized along the same, uniform lines. The elective status of KKN, for example, implies that the educational system classifies subjects into required and elective, presumably using credit system which, in many places, is still a luxury.

## THE COMPONENTS

In spite of all the existing differences and variations in its curricular status, KKN is nevertheless organized to consist of basically the same components.

**Consumer Education.** One of the essential steps which should be taken early in the preparation of KKN is communicating it to the society, inside and outside the campus. This is important because KKN is a relatively new social service scheme which, to be successful, needs not only acceptance but also cooperation from as many parties as can be sufficiently convinced of its merits and suitability, from the rector down to the lecturers



and students in the university, and from the governor down to the lowest local leaders, formal or otherwise, and the community at large in the society. This is done through formal channels like meetings, discussions, seminars etc. as well as direct informal forms like visits, sending leaflets etc. directed primarily to areas to be used for KKN.

**Lectures and practical trainings.** When the required number and qualifications of KKN students for a certain year has been completed, a series of lectures and practical trainings are conducted. The lectures aim at supplying the students with the relevant, general knowledge and background of what they need to know about rural social development which may include subjects and topics such as: Regional Development Plan (of KKN area), Social Approach in Rural Areas, Literacy and Educational Programs, Family Planning, Population Education, Village Government Administration, Village Cooperatives, Rice Planting, Fishery, Cattle Breeding, Community Medicine and of course, the basic ideas and concept of KKN itself. It is certainly not the ambition nor the intention of KKN to produce instant experts in rural development out of the students through these limited lectures. That would be a serious fallacy. The lectures are conducted to give hints to the students what the situation and the problems are like in the rural areas, and what plans and strategy have been set up especially by the government for their development. It will be up to the students' own initiative, intelligence and sensitiveness later to develop their own concept and ways of what is best to do for the villages they are assigned to live. Similarly, the practical trainings, excercises and direct observations are also intended only to show samples of what and how to do things the right way. The training and observation programs may include demonstrations in rice and vegetable planting, cattle inoculation, use of fertilizers, popularizing birth control, constructing sanitation facilities etc.

**Field Orientation.** Preferably prior to, though in many cases following, the lectures and practical trainings, the students are sent to live in the villages they are going to stay later during KKN, for a period of approximately a week. This is intended to give them opportunity to make direct observations of the real situation of the villages in terms of geographical features, the



population, the village local leaders, the potentials, the problems, the existing development plans, and any other direct information and impressions that might be relevant for KKN programs. The students can also begin to familiarize themselves with the kind of life in the village and the ways of life of the people.

**Formulation of Students' Programs.** Based on what is obtained through orientation period, individual programs are formulated. In many cases this is done back in the campus where each student's supervisor can give him advice and consultation in selecting the kinds of projects, the form of activities, the scheduling, the methods, the facilities needed etc. It is important that the programs be made as realistically as possible in terms of time available in KKN, the existing potentials in the village and above all, the actual needs of the village. A well formulated program will be of a very great help not only for the student for planned activities but also for the supervisor in his supervision and evaluation later.

**KKN Proper.** When a student's program is completed he is now ready to begin the part of his KKN which, at least in terms of time allotment and direct contact with the village, is the most essential. During the 3-to-6 month period the student lives there in the village and work toward the realization of his programs. This is really the time when a student's seriousness, responsibility, independence, diligence and resourcefulness and above all endurance are called for. He works mostly on his own initiative. Nobody really forces him what to do, when and how to do it in the village. He should be his own master in a much broader and more concrete sense than in the daily routine of the campus life. He just has to work and do something if he wants the village people to think the way they usually think of educated people like university students. He has to find ways to carry out his plans or to solve the problems he encounters in his work, no matter how. He has to keep himself physically fit and healthy in the village life and food situation which may be drastically different from his own.

**Supervision and Evaluation.** He has, however, the supervisor who is usually a lecturer assigned to supervise approximately 10 students working in neighbouring villages. The supervisor is

scheduled to come, visit and preferably stay with the students in turn periodically. This may be done once in 2 or 3 weeks. During these visits a supervisor can see for himself how his students get on with their KKN programs, how they get along with the village community, what kinds of problems they have, and practically any other things related to their temporary life and work in the village. The series of visits he makes throughout KKN period should give him sufficient data and impressions of each of his students to be able to come out later with a final assessment of their individual KKN programs. Additional data can be obtained from people in the village working with the students, especially from the local leaders. Written reports periodically submitted by the students are often required for yet additional information for evaluation.

**Final Assessment.** The final part of a series of KKN programs is an evaluation and assessment of the total scheme. This is done mostly on campus by KKN staff in various forms through various means, formal or informal, oral or written, through questionnaire or direct comments and exchange of ideas etc. This may involve groups inside or outside the campus: members of the staff, supervisors, students and members of the regional or local government. Conclusions and generalizations are drawn for possible improvements of the following KKN.

## THE SOCIAL RESPONSE

So far as the responses from the society toward KKN are concerned, there seems to be little doubt of its being accepted, wholeheartedly and spontaneously. This has been expressed formally or informally, in private or in public on many occasions in different parts of Indonesia where KKN has been conducted. It has been felt and observed through enthusiastic participation of the people in social activities organized by KKN students like sports programs for the young, sewing, cooking, handicraft or other programs for practical skills for women. One can also see intimate relations which have developed between KKN students and their host villagers. But especially farewells at the end of KKN period, when the students are leaving the village for the campus, are most reveal-



ing and touching. Sentimental parting words are expressed and even tears are often shed. And questions like "When will you be back for another KKN?" or "Why don't you stay longer?" are not infrequently heard. In some cases students are invited back to the village after a formal farewell just to have another farewell among relatives of the host and their close friends. In addition to that, according to the so far unpublished report of a survey on KKN conducted by the Department of Education, 99.9% of the objectively selected respondents expressed their acceptance of KKN.

Even if one still wonders or even suspect, justifiably, whether the favourable responses are genuine and sincere, the widespread and consistently positive expressions give a strong indication that a direct, concrete community scheme like KKN is indeed welcome. In spite of all the problems that KKN naturally still has to face and solve at its relatively young operation, it does not seem to be too erroneous to assume that for the society and the people in the rural areas, KKN is beneficial. In more concrete terms, it implies among other things, the appreciation of the serious attention and efforts of the educated people toward rural area development and the availability of the brains and the skills, if only temporarily, for the improvements of ways and quality of life in the village. In other words it seems that the social benefits and usefulness, or rather expectations, of KKN and its place in the rural development can be clearly and easily identified.

## THE IMPLICATIONS ON EDUCATION

However, other questions and issues around KKN especially those related to its educational implications, may turn out to be more disturbing. There are a number of legible and understandable questions which are frequently asked by those who have and those who have not been involved in its operation, such as: Why should we do KKN when there are so many government bodies with the primary responsibility of developing rural areas? If they, with all their enormous funds and forces, cannot (yet) successfully develop the areas, what can universities with all their limited capabilities, expect to achieve in such a short sporadic time? Are we not creating additional burden to the universities and the students in particular, by installing KKN in the curriculum if it is such a multi-



dimensional scheme? What kind of curriculum will best serve the aims of KKN? How do we evaluate, properly, a student's achievements in KKN, especially if it is a curricular program? . . . . and many other questions which may naturally be asked of this innovative educational scheme. While suitable answers to those questions are not easy to supply in this limited article, it is certainly possible to put forward some impressions based on observation of KKN in operation, especially those with some bearing on education.

First of all as an innovation, KKN offers a rare chance to the university to sit back and think of possibly one of the most basic aspects of its existence: the inter-relationship with the community and the relevance of its programs. The traditional tendency of the university to isolate itself from the often unstable society to keep itself "pure" and free from the social "pollution", has not entirely vanished. As a result, the university is not always aware of the actual living realities. The curriculum and the programs offered, in many cases, do not center around or not even reflect the existing problems and actual demands of the society. The same courses prescribing the same text-books may have been handed down from one generation to another without much questioning of their relevance. New courses, on the other hand, may be introduced with little consideration of their concrete contribution to social development.

In view of that not-very-open minded tradition of the university, KKN is a breakthrough. Through KKN the university looks outward much more than it has in the past. It tries to see what problems the world outside is facing and what difficulties it is fighting. More than that, it makes serious attempts to make use of its potentials including the students and professors, to help what they can in speeding up the development of the less privileged population in the rural areas. KKN then is an encouraging sign of the university's responsiveness toward the real social problems. Nobody, however, should realistically expect the university to focus all its attention to the rural areas only, but an appreciable amount of genuine interest to their problems and serious efforts to help, are justified. This is an attitude that is expected of the university especially in a developing country like Indonesia where the services of its relatively small fortunate group of educated people is more

urgently called for, even while one is still in the process of studying in the university.

To the individual students, KKN offers a rare chance for practice, experience and maturity. They can apply what they have learned in theory from textbooks and lectures. They can put into practice their knowledge on simple management principles in their activities. They have a chance to exploit and manipulate their personal abilities to approach, persuade and convince people of what to do and how to do things better, and to move them to concrete actions. If they can do these things successfully, they will certainly get not only personal satisfaction but also reinforcement of what they may already know of themselves and their capabilities, both of which are of vital importance for their self-confidence. In fact, even if failures may often occur, they still get valuable lessons which they may never forget for the rest of their lives and help them avoid the same mistakes.

But KKN is open to, or rather demands, much more than just what the individual students with their limited knowledge can do. The existing problems in society may not necessarily correlate with a KKN student's major discipline. And yet he is still expected to be functional in that society and be of some concrete help. Besides the social problems may be too complex for approaches which are limited to one discipline only. Plausible solutions of the problems may demand cooperation of students of various disciplines or at least the application of principles of disciplines different from one's own. This interdisciplinary nature of KKN should demonstrate very clearly to the students that, in direct confrontation with concrete social problems, a narrow-minded and excessive adherence to one's own field is futile, and the necessity to acknowledge the importance of others' discipline is unavoidable. And this is an expensive educational value.

It is not the main purpose of KKN to let the students live in the village and join all the physical work that the villagers do in daily life in the houses or in the fields: ploughing, weeding, feeding cattle, building houses etc. That would only mean an insignificant addition of a couple of hands, mostly unskilled, to the manual labourers available in the village. On the other hand, KKN does not specify that students should only watch the villagers work, and give orders, without any knowledge whatsoever or willingness to

be physically involved, if necessary. That would be rude, to say the least. They are expected primarily to contribute their brains and knowledge in doing things better. If not by relying on their own knowledge, they are at least in a better position to know where to go, whom to consult in university or in town, for help, which is something the village people may be ignorant of or do not have the courage to do. But it would certainly be practical and sympathetic if the students are also able and willing to be directly involved, even if only occasionally, in the manual work. That would at least demonstrate the solidarity and sincerity of their service. A good KKN, therefore, cannot help involving the students in manual and concrete work in the field and it helps a lot in building up a more proportionate respect to this kind of work among intellectuals.

Another thing which may also be of some significance, educationally, is the direct impressions the students can get in KKN of the simplicity, or backwardness, of the life in the rural areas, and of the great demand of the village for services of the skilled and educated people. They can see and feel for themselves the enormous gap that still exists between the urban and rural areas as far as social welfare and living conditions are concerned. This can be a challenge for them later when they have graduated, to offer their services to the people and the development of the rural areas. They may not really be able to accomplish significant services during their KKN, but if they can develop this attitude along with other attitudes, then KKN, on top of its other ambitions, is primarily an educational scheme which aims at producing educated citizens who are more (rural) development oriented.



# PANCASILA DEMOCRACY\*

MASHURI

Present usage of the term 'democracy' indicates considerable distortion in the meaning of that term. Countries which refer to themselves as democratic employ a wide range of political structures and mechanisms which not only differ from one to another, but are sometimes even mutually contradictory. On one side we see 'democratic' countries which are tolerant and permissive in regulating the political life of their societies, while on the other extreme there are 'democratic' countries where that regulation is intolerant and repressive. With respect to the inculcation of democratic values there is also a great deal of variation among those countries which refer to themselves as 'democratic'. Here again we may note a dichotomy between those countries which are marked by the presence of continuous political turmoil and those in which political life is governed by either a static or dynamic sense of calm.

Yet, however many definitions are assigned to the term 'democracy', it is generally held that a democratic society is characterized by: 1) attempts to improve the standard of living of its people in accordance with the standards of human dignity and values; and 2) the opportunity for concerned members of that society to participate in the making of decisions which affect the common interest. In other words, the essence of 'democratic life' is the mobilization of the entire potential of the society to face common (national) problems together.

Differences among various countries in the implementation of a democratic system result from differences in meaning which are assigned to the two characteristics cited above: 1) differences of philosophic conceptions concerning 'human dignity and values';

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\* Speech of the Minister of Information before a joint session of the general and special committees of the press council in Bandung on June 30, 1977.

and 2) differences in the method employed in channeling the people's participation in decision-making which, in turn, result from basic differences in the life view of a society concerning the position and location of man with respect to his environment. Countries which hold to the precepts of 'individualism', for example, maintain that the dignity and values of humanity are realized in the individual who enjoys full sovereignty in exercising certain inviolate basic rights, while the society is not considered important.

Countries which hold to 'communism' as one form of 'collectivism', on the contrary, maintain that human dignity and values are enjoyed as a member of society who supports the happiness and welfare of that society. Here it is the society which is the center of focus, while the individual is not considered particularly important.

Furthermore, countries which hold the view that man is always threatened by his environment are inclined to establish a political system which is confrontative in its methods for channeling the aspirations of its members to participate in the decision-making process, while countries or societies which view man and his environment as two interdependent parts of a single entity are inclined to create a political system which is accommodative.

From the discussion above we conclude that the political system which emerges in a given country or society is a projection of the values which are rooted in the culture of that society into the field of politics.

On the basis of the foregoing observations the following questions are worthy of our consideration:

- (1) What are the basic characteristics of the tenets of Pancasila concerning life and mankind?
- (2) How can this fundamental view of life and mankind be projected into the political field for the creation of Pancasila Democracy?

There are several basic values which may serve as a point of departure in examining the elements of the Pancasila philosophical view. If we draw upon those values which are rooted in society we can construct the following picture of Indonesian man:

- (1) Man who is capable of maintaining a balance between the pursuit of public and private interests. Note: this characteristic is similar to the attitude associated with 'homo socio-economicus' where there is a balance between the attitude of 'homo socius' (emphasizing the welfare of society) and that of 'homo economicus' (emphasizing personal welfare).
- (2) Man who is capable of engendering a harmonious relationship between himself and his environment; whether it be his physical or social environment.
- (3) Man who knows himself and is capable of maintaining a balance between his wants and his capabilities.
- (4) Man who is conscious of the fact that 'to exist' is 'to exist among others' and that he is an inseparable part of a larger whole where he is in a position of mutual interdependence with respect to his environment.
- (5) Man who gives thanks for the 'gifts of God' because he is aware that life itself is a product of the Almighty Creator.

Pancasila man who possesses the consciousness and views toward life and his environment alluded to above is inclined toward certain specific forms of behavior in political life, while, at the same time, rejecting forms of behavior which are considered incompatible with those basic values.

The form of democracy which develops out of the cultural system which gave birth to those attitudes manifests characteristics which are different from those manifested by liberal democracy. If we heed the facts of history of our own society, we can see that in their social and political life our forefathers always strove to develop conventions which were in accordance with those previously described attitudes toward man, environment and the interaction between the two. Here there are numerous examples of traditional political conventions which we might consider.

In the process of public decision-making we have opted for the principle of consensus and strive to avoid the employment of the principle of absolute majority vote. The principle of consensus has long been institutionalized in our society as is reflected in the Minangkabau expression "water is shaped by its container, opinion is shaped by consensus" (Bulat air karena pembuluh, bulat kata karena mufakat). In this connection it may be said that Indonesian society has since long ago always tried to determine those wishes which are held in common and not just to heed those of the strongest and largest group.



It may also be said that in our social system the prime consideration in reaching consensus is that the problem under consideration be resolved to the mutual satisfaction of all parties concerned and not by the victory of one over the others. From this tradition we can infer that in our politics at present dictatorial practices — whether by an individual acting as dictator or by a majority group — are unacceptable. This inference is supported by empirical evidence. Our past experience indicates that the principle of 'absolute majority vote' completely paralyzed political life in our country.

The second inference which we can draw from this traditional political convention is that the institution of opposition is incompatible with the soul and spirit of Pancasila Democracy.

We might further conjecture that the institution of opposition is a product of the Western world view which holds that man views his environment as an enemy which threatens his existence. This view which derives from the principle of the 'survival of the fittest' contributes to an attitude of confrontation against an environment which must be subjugated. In political life this attitude is realized in the form of the institution of opposition which aims to oppose and cause the fall of its opponents who hold the reins of government.

In this connection the politico-moral question which we must answer together is, in my opinion, what kind of inter-relationship or interaction among the political groups in our society must we establish in order to face all the dangers, challenges and problems of the present? This question must be answered by us together, not as individuals. The consideration which I consider relevant in answering this question pertains to the differences which exist between the basic attitudes underlying Pancasila Democracy and those which underly the Liberal Democratic system which we have known in the history of our political life. If under Pancasila Democracy the basic attitude of those groups who sit in the People's Representative Assemblies is to safeguard harmony and balance for the prosperity and happiness of the entire society (accomodative), under Liberal Democracy the basic attitude of confrontation gives rise to the institution of opposition.

On the basis of those considerations and in our situation at the present time the development within Pancasila Democracy of an

institution of opposition such as that found in the system of Liberal Democracy (Western European Democracy) would be to plant the seeds of destruction by opening up the possibility for the emergence of social conflagrations which we want to avoid. That in itself would be a waste which would hinder the progress of development which is already faced by many limitations.

However, I feel it necessary to emphasize here that the non-existence of an institution of opposition does not mean that control of the government is entirely non-existent. Control must continue to exist and it must be exercised by the entire legislative body. It is not necessary that control be exercised in the form of opposition to that group which happens to govern by the group which happens not to govern, but should be conducted for the sake of bringing about improvements in the implementation of programs.

Under the system of National Leadership which is determined by the provisions of the 1945 Constitution a satisfactory system of control is outlined. The MPR (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat or People's Consultative Assembly) as the embodiment of the people's sovereignty, not only draws up the Broad Outlines of State Policy (Garis Besar Haluan Negara or GBHN), but also elects the President (and Vice-President) who then becomes the Mandatory of the MPR for the implementation of the GBHN. In this case the position of the President is inferior to that of the MPR which may at any time request that the President give a statement of accountability concerning the fulfillment of his responsibilities. As was mentioned above, the DPR (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat or People's Representative Council) as a whole also exercises control against the government. Moreover, noting that the members of the DPR are also simultaneously members of the MPR, if it so desires the DPR can propose the convening of a General Session of the MPR for the purpose of requesting a statement of accountability by the Mandatory of that body.

It seems necessary that I insert a few notes here about that institution of opposition. If that institution of opposition which was referred to above is said to be irrelevant for Pancasila Democracy, it may also be pointed out that in the countries of the West that institution can and has also been done away with under certain conditions. One such illustration is the situation in England during the 1930's (the Ramsey McDonald Cabinet) and during the Second



World War (the Churchill Cabinet) at which time a National Unity Government was set up and the various groups of political forces joined together to overcome the emergency situation which was emerging.

If a situation of emergency was the basis for approval in that instance, the present situation in our own country is not very much different. If we are prepared to look closely at our present situation and project into the future, we can not help but recognize the existence of emergency conditions. That is to say that there exist dangerous threats to our national life both at present and, especially, in the not far distant future. The speed of technological development causes the growth of imbalances between the developed countries and those which are developing. When combined with the introduction of negative influences from outside, the presence of subversive elements internally and limitations in almost every field — e.g. investment, skills and the availability of trained manpower — everything points to the existence of disturbances in fields which are vital to our development efforts. In a situation such as this it is my opinion that the risks are too great for us to foster the institution of opposition or an 'opposition culture' which is clearly not rooted in our own culture. It is well that we should remember what occurred in Germany (Weimar Republic), Spain (Pre-Franco) and in South Vietnam. In each of those cases we can see the tragedy which resulted from infatuation with opposition for the sake of defending national democratic values at times which were loaded with signs of national emergency.

## THE PROCESS OF GROWTH OF PANCASILA DEMOCRACY

At the time we were waging our independence struggle in 1945 we had practically nothing other than a strong unanimous sense of social solidarity which made our national unity as strong as steel. In the end it was that national solidarity which gave us victory and made it possible for us to stand as a nation.

The development of the liberal democratic system which we adopted early in our national life by setting aside the 1945 Constitution gradually eroded that social solidarity. In its place there emerged groups which each possessed their own mutually conflicting interests.



During the 1950's, while our physical-economic condition grew relatively prosperous, the loss of our weapon of invulnerability in the form of that social solidarity caused our national growth to enter a critical and disturbing era. Political life was marked by continuous disputes between political forces both within and outside of the halls of the people's representatives. The opposition group and the governing political group launched continuous attacks against each other which resulted in frequent replacements of the Cabinet; each one only capable of maintaining itself for an average of six months. The press also aided in this process of disintegration by over emphasizing the side of freedom in its reporting and paying little attention to the side of responsibility.

It is impossible to maintain stability in a situation where disturbances of security emerge one after another-i.e. Westerling, Republic of the South Moluccas, Kahar Muzakar, Darul Islam, etc. In such a situation it is impossible to carry on development. The continuation of this kind of situation causes the economy to experience a process of decline to which there is no clear end. The General Elections which were conducted in 1955 were also unable to bring this decline to an end. Moreover, they added to the gravity of the situation. Likewise the Constituent Assembly which was elected in 1957 was deadlocked and proved to be incapable of producing a new constitution.

In an attempt to overcome this situation of turmoil former President Soekarno introduced the concept of Guided Democracy which was implemented in the following stages:

- (1) an appeal to disband the political parties on October 28, 1956 (which was not agreed to by most of the parties);
- (2) the Presidential Concept of February 21, 1957 which proposed the formation of a Self-Help Cabinet (Kabinet Gotong Royong, also referred to as Kabinet Kuda Kaki Empat or the Four-Legged Horse Cabinet) which was also unsuccessful;
- (3) the formation of the Working Cabinet (Kabinet Karya) on July 12, 1957; and
- (4) further steps which included the achievement of consensus among the Council of Ministers, the then President and the National Council on the return to the 1945 Constitution.

On February 16-20, 1959 the First Pancasila Seminar was held in Yogyakarta. Among the decisions taken there the Seminar supported the concept of Guided Democracy within the framework of the return to the 1945 Constitution. These decisions were then offered by the President to the Constituent Assembly as a way of ending the continuing deadlock. Still there was no response from the Constituent Assembly and the deadlock continued. Then on July 5, 1959 the return to the 1945 Constitution was decreed by the President. This action marked the formal end of Liberal Democracy and the beginning of a new system in the democratic life of our country — i.e. Guided Democracy.

In evaluating the experiment with Guided Democracy we need to differentiate between the concept and the practice which later came to be implemented. This comparison clearly indicates the existence of inconsistencies and contradictions between the two.

As put forward during the Pancasila Seminar the idea of Guided Democracy was, in principle, based upon the precepts of the philosophy of Pancasila. But that idea was not intended as simply a continuation of the development and enrichment of those precepts, but rather a natural consequence of the precepts of Pancasila. Yet, in practice, the implementation of Guided Democracy was dictated by only one man (the late Dr. Ir. Soekarno) and the life of the entire state was gradually carried by him onto a path which deviated completely from the letter and spirit of the provisions of the 1945 Constitution. Moreover, in the later development of Guided Democracy the reins of control were lost altogether. In the end this situation led to the events at Crocodile Hole (Lubang Buaya) on October 1, 1965.

After the failure of Guided Democracy there emerged the New Order with Democracy Pancasila which bases everything on the pure precepts of the 1945 Constitution and Pancasila.

On the basis of those historical facts I categorically reject every charge that with the rejection of the system of opposition à la Liberal Democracy which is inherent in the basic values and political traditions of Pancasila Democracy we will return to the system of Guided Democracy in its Nasakom form.



## EVALUATION OF THE PRESENT SITUATION IN INDONESIA

Let us now turn our attention to the development of this system of Pancasila Democracy in the days to come. We invite your attention because of the certainty that it is only the system of democracy which is rooted in our own cultural value system which is capable of mobilizing the strength and national potential to face and resolve national problems.

At the present time our development efforts are concentrating on the following basic problems: (1) the problem of national development growth; (2) the problem of stability; and (3) the problem of national survival.

These three problem areas appear to be separate, but they are in fact closely linked one to the other. The three of them together form a single problem which must be faced as an integrated totality. All of our efforts to resolve these three basic problems must be conducted in an integrated manner. We can no longer approve of methods which either emphasize or de-emphasize any one of these three types of efforts. I think that it is only with this kind of concentrated effort that we will be able to successfully carry out our national development efforts.

National development growth must be maintained and its continuity guaranteed. This growth covers the fields of economics, technology and science. National economic growth is a necessity for the achievement of increases in such basic needs of the people as basic nutritional requirements, shelter, health, education and employment opportunity. Growth requires investment and increased activity and efforts in the economic field. At present those efforts are based upon the principle of providing stimulation in the form of a just profit which is arrived at via the market mechanism. This process gives rise to competition which, in its turn, speeds growth. And yet, another aspect of this market mechanism is that it has given rise to imbalances between the strong and the weak. This imbalance will continue to grow dependent upon the extent of freedom present in the marketplace and, in the end, will give rise to feelings of dissatisfaction throughout the society.

Increases in the control and use of science and technology are prerequisite to the maintenance of continuity in development. The



gap in this field between the developed and the developing countries is widening which results in the increasing dependency of the latter upon the former. This is a source of alarm.

Absolute stability is needed for development because without stability it is impossible for development to succeed. Remembering that our society is dynamic, the stability which we must create is a dynamic stability in an atmosphere or climate which invites all social groups to share in shouldering the burden of development efforts. Such a climate can be created by steps which encourage positive interaction between groups and forces in every field, by advancing the realization of national idealism and by increasing knowledge and skills. Without these growth will experience hindrances the effect of which will be to cause a setback in stability. That national survival should be considered a problem must seem incredible, but when we consider present world developments, it is evident that imbalances in every field are increasingly widespread and profound.

Life in the big developed countries bear interests which are increasingly large and widespread. The increasing immensity and diversity of their interests makes it mandatory that they protect and guarantee those interests. They are spurred on in these efforts by one another while they are both supported and speeded on by scientific and technological development.

The widespread use of science and technology in such fields as economics, military affairs, the collection of information and organizational and institutional development causes the developing countries to be left increasingly far behind, wider and deeper imbalances and, finally, their being left on the wayside to be crushed by those in power.

The continuation of life as a respected nation is threatened and it is, therefore, very important to strengthen life as a respected nation. The mandate of independence to upgrade the level and quality of the life of a nation is unconditional. The increase of national idealism by implanting love and pride of nation, faithfulness to fatherland, nation and country and the development of national discipline will strengthen national life and immutability. The problem of the process of regeneration must also be resolved within this context.

Even distribution of the benefits of development creates righteousness in the legal domain which is capable of dispensing justice which will, in turn, increase social solidarity. Increased solidarity itself will strengthen stability and, thus, create conditions for the speeding up of growth. On the contrary, the existence of imbalances caused by misuses in various fields has already weakened social solidarity which could result in the disturbance of stability.

With the above description it should be clear how those three basic problems are linked one to another in a functional manner. That trilogy is a problem and challenge which must be able to be overcome in the best manner possible. If we are unsuccessful in overcoming this real dilemma, the result is that we will be left further and further behind in the development of technology and made the object of the products of technology and new inventions. With this development we will become more and more dependent upon others. In order to resolve this dilemma what is needed is a satisfactory government which has character and integrity.

Let us return here to the moral-political question which I put forward earlier: what is to be our basic attitude in facing this situation of dilemma? Shall we concentrate on the formation of a national strength with integrity or shall we emphasize the playing of a psuedo-game for the sake of 'democracy'? In my opinion the true system of Pancasila Democracy has its source in the values which are rooted in our culture and this is the only alternative which will mobilize the potential of the people to surmount the challenges which have obstructed our development efforts until now.

## CONCLUSIONS

Positive interaction either in the relations among political forces or in the relations between the press, the government and the society at large must be capable of creating a dynamic within the framework of stability. This kind of dynamic with stability (the popular phrase is 'dynamic stability') will be capable of speeding up national development growth and at the same time will foster social solidarity which is the basis for the resolution of our national problems.

The development of Pancasila Democracy along these lines will be capable of implanting a democratic system of character which bears authority and which is functional.



# ENERGY PERSPECTIVES OF THE THIRD WORLD\*

Sumitro DJOJOHADIKUSUMO

Future perspectives provide a contour of our global system in transformation. It entails structural changes and permanent shifts in its political and economic parameters. This process is not merely a temporary deviation from an assumedly fixed equilibrium. The international system has moved away from a frame which was evolved three decades ago under entirely different conditions. Henceforth for the next three decades and more, it will be forced to move towards new points of equilibrium. In all likelihood these will be at higher levels of costs and prices, with particular emphasis on energy fuels and basic materials. The above trends reflect underlying forces of a fundamental nature. They have been at work for some time but have come to the fore only recently. They will be with us possibly for the next half century. They are connected with the role of and the interaction between natural resources, population and technology, and hence with the impact of such interaction on the human environment.

## REFERENCE FOR THIRD WORLD ENERGY PERSPECTIVES

In the light of the above contour, important points of reference for Third World energy perspectives are the unequal distribution of world energy consumption (for the greater part reflecting a maldistribution of world incomes) and an uneven locational distribution of the world's new energy resources of the future. Presently 75 per cent of the countries of the world (comprising more than 70 per cent of the world population) consume less than

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\* Paper presented to the Epilogue of the World Energy Conference in Istanbul, 28 September 1977.

2 kw per capita per annum. At the other end of the spectrum 3 per cent of all countries (primarily North America) consume between 7-12 kw per capita per annum. The remaining 22 per cent of countries (including all of Europe) consume between 2-7 kw per capita per annum. How and to which degree this pattern of energy consumption will change depend on which of the various scenarios of growth rates projections will come true, relative to the sub-systems of our global planet. Another reference to consider is the uneven distribution of resources particularly of the 'new' kind of future energy: nuclear, coal (in its various technology manifestations of fluidized bed combustion, gasification, liquefaction, MHD), oil shale, tar sand and solar. North America, Australia and the Soviet Union (the "Euro-Asian landmass") have reportedly the largest share of such resources, especially coal, whereas the poorer countries comprising most of Asia, Africa and Latin America have none.

Rather than by 'autonomous' developments of technology and economics proper, the contour's 'relief' of Third World energy perspectives will be greatly determined by policy management of nation-states within an appropriate international and regional framework. Above all, it depends on an acute awareness now and therefore on the consistent exertion of the political will as to the required structural pattern of policy management both on a national scale and in the realm of the international system. The political and economic bases for action are no longer tuned to short range influences of the so-called 'market place'.

The development of the world's natural resources, and the attendant roles of science and technology, have been geared so far to the increasing demands of high-level income groups with excessive consumption patterns prevalent in the advanced countries and among a thin layer of upper strata within the developing societies. Developments have brought about a relative scarcity in basic materials while falling short of meeting the basic needs of the world population at large. They have aggravated the contrasts and disparities between rich and poor, between nations in the international context as well as within the societies of the respective nation-states. Therefore a drastic reorientation of development strategies and objectives is overdue. In this context the social phenomena of poverty and unemployment and their eradication must be regarded as economic priorities of the first order.



The process of growth is thus made a function of policies and policy management which aim at providing people with the basic requirements of food, clothing, shelter, education, health and with remunerative employment. In other words the structure of production and the utilization of productive resources (human resources, natural resources, capital, technology) must be arranged or rearranged with the above policy objectives and priorities in mind.

The foregoing has gained general acceptance as a concept among the countries of the Third World. In terms of effective policies however we are able as yet to discern mere glimpses of a timid beginning. This shift in policy orientation poses indeed daunting problems at the very moment of its implementation. It involves nothing less than an overall transformation of structural relationships in the process of accumulation and allocation of resources as well as in their distributional aspects. Hence it presupposes the will among the body-politic to effectuate changes in the prevailing political parameters. The challenge is multiplied by resistances within the social fabric of many developing countries. These are connected with vested interests among the upper strata as well as with social and economic power structures at the village level. Where the need for change or modification is conceded, they are more often than not regarded, or rather preferred, to occur very gradually and slightly.

While all this is the prime responsibility of national governments, it is also obvious that developing nations need an international framework which is conducive to and can reinforce national policies of that nature. The combined intensified efforts of the Third World towards a new international economic order is the international dimension of the structural changes deemed necessary as to the patterns of development and the direction of growth.

Within the framework of a reorientation of development strategies and objectives, the breakthrough from the traps of absolute poverty and unemployment can only be conceived as a process of accelerated growth with equity. When all is said and done, it entails a continued and intensified utilization of productive resources, — albeit along a different path and in a different pattern so as to ensure (hopefully) resource availability for an indefinite period.



## RESOURCE ADEQUACY AND CONSTRAINTS

For the longer run aspects of resource adequacy, it appears that policy makers, planners, captains of industry and scientists rely in the main (again hopefully) on man's ingenuity, i.e. new scientific, technical and social knowledge. But meanwhile there is the time dimension. The WAES-study alerting us that "the supply of oil will fail to meet increasing demand before the year 2000, most probably between 1985 and 1995, even if energy prices rise 50 per cent above current levels in real terms", must not be treated lightly and much less brushed aside.<sup>1</sup> Even if it is agreed that the notion of materials scarcity in the absolute sense is speculative rather than established fact, we have entered the stage of relative materials imbalances, i.e. in supply demand relationships, with specific reference to energy fuels and certain basic minerals. These imbalances represent excess effective demand under the prevailing conditions of primary reserves, known technology, available capital stock, inadequate productive capacity for the material concerned, in some cases insufficient processing facilities, and of the political economy of ecology and environmental impact. This situation has in itself aggravated the plight of the world's poor. It has magnified the ramifications of the present maldistribution of world incomes which preclude the minimal basic needs from being translated into effective demand.

On the demand side for resources, contemporary evidence demonstrates a built-in rigidity. Particularly among middle-income and higher income groups there is a basic conservatism in the direction of demands as well as in other patterns of life.<sup>2</sup> They will continue to exert effective claim on the world's resources commensurate to their 'style of life'. In this connection an intriguing observation is made by the demographer, Nathan Keyfitz.<sup>3</sup> His review of raw materials use by people indicates that affluence is relatively more important than population. As income rises, per

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1 *Energy: Global Prospects 1985-2000*, Report of the Workshop on Alternative Energy Strategies, Project Director Carroll L. Wilson, M.I.T., McGraw Hill, New York, 1977

2 Gunnar Myrdal, *Environment and Economic Growth*, Commemorative Lecture, International Conference on Environment, organized by Nihon Kaisha Shimbun, Tokyo, May 26-28, 1976

3 Nathan Keyfitz, *World Resources and the World Middle-Class*, Scientific American, July 1976

capita consumption goes up. The increase of affluence has much more effect in terms of impact on the materials base than the increase of population as such. Thus the movement of people from poorer groups into the middle-class has more effect on materials and the environment than the increase in the number of poor people. Keyfitz suggests that in terms of materials impact the weight of a middle-class person is in many respects more than five times that of a poor person such as typically represented by the peasant in Java or Nigeria. Leaving aside whether it will be five times or less, Keyfitz's proposition regarding the multiple impact of affluence is eminently plausible. This dimension of the problem must be added to the pressures of sheer numbers in population growth that for most of the Third World, is expected to continue throughout and beyond the remainder of this century.

There is the report prepared by a United Nations' team under the direction of Wassily Leontief.<sup>4</sup> According to the report the world is expected to consume during the last 30 years of the twentieth century from 3 to 4 times as many minerals as have been consumed throughout the whole previous history of civilization. Between 1970 and 2000 the demand for copper is expected to increase 4.8 times, for bauxite and zinc 4.2 times, nickel 4.3 times, lead 5.8 times, iron ore 4.7 times, petroleum 5.2 times, natural gas 4.5 times and coal 5.0 times. Leontief's estimates were adjusted, where possible, to take into account the influence of future technologies on resource development and consumption. It is held that known world resources of metallic minerals and fossil fuels are generally sufficient to supply world requirements through the remaining decades of this century, and probably into the early part of the next century as well.

On the supply side, however, I believe that future energy supply will turn out to be much more inelastic than has been the case in the past. I present my arguments in summary fashion as follows.

*First*, fossil fuels will continue to play a dominant role throughout the years 2000-2020. In the meantime the main strategy pursued by the advanced world is connected with the

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4 *The Future of the World Economy*, United Nations, New York 1976 containing Preface, Introduction and Summary. The full study is to be published by the United Nations as *The Future of the World Economy: A study on the impact of Prospective Economic Issues and Policies on the International Development Strategy*, ST/ESA/44, Sales No.: E. 76. II. A. 6.



development of coal and nuclear energy. In both cases the economic pattern is conditioned by the fuel cycle. The main bottleneck is right at the start, viz. the availability and supply of natural uranium and the right type of coal. In addition, the geographical inequalities in the distribution of coal and uranium deposits will pose problems of political economy, not unlike to those of oil. Therefore the assumption in the Eden report to the extent that after the year 2000 the share of nuclear power would be 50 to 60 per cent of electricity generated must be viewed with extreme caution.<sup>5</sup> *Second*, there are the constraints in the world's *engineering* and *construction capacity* connected with intensified explorations and with the technologies of nuclear energy as well as of more conventional sources (e.g. coal liquefaction and gasification), all at the same time.<sup>6</sup> *Third*, there is the limiting factor of the sheer *magnitude of investment requirements* connected with the intended programmes for the expansion of various energy sources, also all at the same time. Estimates of such requirements are staggering. They are far bigger than could be financed by any conceivable surpluses of oil producing countries. *Fourth*, the long lead period due to the needs and considerations of *ecology and environment* which have become burning political issues in both advanced and developing countries.

In view of the general relations of supply and demand, set forth in the preceding paragraphs, it is only to be expected that prices of oil and other important materials will remain high. They will still be a multiple of those before January 1974. The following factors combined are at the back of this phenomenon: (1) the element of "economic rent" (royalty) related to a depleting finite resource of strategic importance; (2) the element of "monopolistic" or "oligopolistic rent" related to the structure of the market and the nature of the commodity. Governments of producing countries are in a position to enforce a redistribution of this rent by claiming a larger share thereof. In the past it was almost to the exclusive benefit of the international oil and mining companies; (3) the determination of the oil consumer countries to become indepen-

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5 *World Energy Demand to 2020*, prepared by the Energy Research Group, Cavendish Laboratory, Cambridge, England, 1977

6 Substantive support for some of my propositions is to be found in *Technological Review*, containing an excellent assessment of "Project Independence" by the M.I.T. Energy Laboratory.



dent from external supplies, which in effect means that in the meanwhile imports will only be permitted at (higher) prices which do not undercut the market shares of domestic production; (4) the depreciation of international currencies presents a dilemma to oil producing countries as to whether they should expand production or keep it at present levels. The above set of propositions find corroborative substantiation in Leontief's projected increases in the prices of important materials: an increase in the relative price of bauxite by the year 2000, as compared to 1970, of 17 per cent; an increase of the price of lead 2.2 times, of nickel and zinc 2.3 times, copper 2.6 times, petroleum 3.3 times and natural gas 7.6 times. These projected changes do not take into account special conditions in world markets but relate only to the condition of mineral extraction.

### RAMIFICATIONS FOR THE THIRD WORLD

What do the energy perspectives, set forth above, mean to the Third World? For the resource owning among the developing countries, they provide an opportunity for expanded export capacity, the potential for higher tax ratios and improved development performance with diversification of the economy. But for the resource-poor countries, and these constitute the majority in the developing world, they pose the specter of stagnation and deterioration, — unless the international system would enable policy management to cope with the riddles and dilemmas inherent in future trends. Among many other issues, the distributional aspects of the burdens of inflation and of food supplies in the face of a growing population come to the fore.

With the higher price levels for energy and other important minerals, we must assume that inflation will be with us for the next few decades at sustained annual rates above those during the period 1950-1970. Those high rates are transmitted to international trade and are reflected in the prices of food, capital goods, manufactures and freight services, exported to developing countries. Obsolete is the view that recessions and increased unemployment will by themselves cause inflation to abate. This notion just does not hold in our present day world. Institutional changes have taken root in the advanced industrial societies which tend to perpetuate increases of costs and prices: the rigidity of

wages combined with an elaborate system of unemployment insurance and other social benefits, which are in many cases tied to price levels. Thus reduced industrial output and large-scale unemployment do not preclude high rates of inflation. There will still be a good deal of consumer spending. The phenomena of "stagflation" or even "slumpflation" are not as unusual or abnormal as we are led to believe. What is certain is that the social and political strains of rapid inflation with reduced growth rates have become much greater. Thus the crux of the matter is for all countries, rich and poor, to put greater emphasis on and display more concern with the *distributional aspects of the burdens of inflation*.

The basic social policy question is which social groups should bear the burden and in what proportions? Should wages be allowed to lag to the benefit of profits in order to permit either greater savings and investment or to dampen cost and effective demand? Alternatively, for considerations of equity and social stability, should public policy tilt towards efforts to keep the rise in wages at least at the level of the consumer price index, relying on increased productivity, management efficiency, and cost reducing technology to contain the rate of inflation within tolerable limits? Should special measures be adopted to cushion fixed income recipients and the lowest income groups from the inordinate impact of inflation that would otherwise fall upon them?

Most public policy discussions show an apparent lack of attention to this aspect of the inflation problem. Anti-inflation policies in the developed part of the world have up to now in general relied on a combination of high interest rates and efforts to reduce government spending across the board. These are measures that act on macro magnitudes and contain no element of differential structural or distributional effects as an inherent part of the policy goals.

The distributional aspects of the burden of inflation is of urgent relevance in terms of the food problem faced by most of the world population. The food crisis is, apart from present or potential inadequacy of world production, one that emerges from the sharp inequality in the distribution of world income. This maldistribution of incomes precludes the real needs in food deficit countries from being translated in effective demand for supplies from the food surplus countries. Under the prevailing conditions



the poorest countries embracing about 800 million people are just unable to meet the total costs of food, fertilizers and other commodities essential to their development or even existence. If furthermore population growth continues unabated, this distributional problem is likely to pass into a situation of global shortage at some stage in the future.

Keyfitz proposition of the multiple impact of income rises on the demand for resources combined with that caused by the sheer numbers of population increase in large parts of the Third World constitute a double edged sword. It tends to make the concepts of income – and price elasticities of demand *irrelevant* as it concerns the sheer *need* for survival.

We must further consider the effects that demand for materials have on the living organisms, hence in this context on the state of renewable resources such as land, water and vegetation. A case in point is the intensified search for uranium and the expected role of coal which has re-emerged as an important source of energy. How will all this affect the surrounding land, crops and trees, particularly in areas of tropical rain forest? It may have far reaching consequences for water supply and soil conditions. The capability of developing countries to meet present and future requirements of food and habitation in the face of population growth depends critically on the availability of land and water resources. I would hold that in dealing with the issues of food and habitation, of urban growth and increased agricultural demand all at the same time, water is likely to be the most intractable constraint, more so than land as land and soil conditions are greatly dependent on water. In turn water resources must be seen in direct connection with forestry and forestry management. Deforestation has caused soil erosion on an extended scale and perennial floods. Current soil erosion is such that a great deal of potential crop production is lost annually through decline in soil fertility, increased flooding and silting of low lands, irrigation canals and reservoirs.

In this connection I would like to draw attention to a specific kind of energy crisis, particularly affecting the Third World. It has astonishingly received little attention in the deliberations of proliferating forums on energy. Yet it concerns an essential need of the poor masses, viz. firewood. Eckholm has forcefully pointed out that the need for firewood and the resulting degradation of



woodland throughout Asia, Africa and Latin America lie at the heart of what will likely be "the most profound ecological challenge of the late twentieth century".<sup>7</sup>

At least half of the world's timber cut still fulfills its original role for humans, viz. a source for cooking fuel and warmth. The amount of wood being burned in a particular country is determined by the number of people who need it. Per capita fuel wood consumption averages 1 ton per annum.<sup>8</sup> Coal, gas, electricity and since the rise of oil prices, kerosene, have all become out of reach of the world's poor. Over the long run many of those using firewood will have to turn in directions other than fossil fuels.

## TECHNOLOGY AND ENERGY PERSPECTIVES

Perceptions of future technology are full of imponderables. I cannot say more than that future technology will have to be seen in functional relationship to resource development and resource conservation. In the realm of energy sources I have already mentioned coal and nuclear energy, shale oil, tar sands. Concomittantly, the challenge for science, scientific research and technology centers around such questions as: how to produce goods and to provide services with less material. In other words, the application of Malenbaum's concept<sup>9</sup> of the "intensity-of-use coefficients" with relative shifts from "quantity inputs" to "quality inputs". Further, how to substitute materials that are common for those that are scarce; how to get desired results with less energy; how to obtain that energy from sources other than from and supplementary to fossil fuels, and the like.<sup>10</sup> To the extent that the time dimension in the implementation of the relative inventions is crucial than everything that is done to hasten invention will pay off. For example, to return for a moment to the firewood crisis as this affects the

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7 Erik P. Eckholm, *Losing Ground*, W.W. Norton & Co., Inc., New York, 1976, Ch. 6, p. 101-113

8 In view of the above I should think that the projections in the Eden report pertinent to wood consumption for energy purposes are much too low. *World Energy Demand to 2020 op.cit.*, p. 27

9 Wilfred Malenbaum, *Materials Requirements in the United States and Abroad in the Year 2000*, Washington, D.C., March 1973

10 Nathan Keyfitz, *op. cit.*

world's poor and a large part of the world population, two long term alternatives where the processes must be accelerated by intensified research, cost reduction and extended application are *solar energy* for cooking and heating and *bio-conversion*, entailing both bio-mass processes and bio-gas plants capable of securing gaseous fuel and organic manure from cattle dung and night soil through the process of fermentation in generating chambers specially made for the purpose.

## ENERGY PERSPECTIVES AND THE ENVIRONMENT

In the light of the foregoing observations, it is mandatory that the new directions of growth and the changes of development patterns must include environment considerations. Environmental impact assessment must be made part and parcel of the evaluation of major development proposals.<sup>11</sup>

It is often alleged that economic systems aim to optimize gains over the short term, while on the other hand ecological considerations suggest ways to minimize liabilities over the long run. If such views ever had validity, they must surely be cast aside. Disagreements between economists and ecologists may have hinged on their differing perspective of time. The present world situation and our perspective of the future must have, or should have, eliminated such differences.

In operational terms this means that much of what once was conventionally considered as social expenditures for environment conservation must be included in the cost of investment. The concept of cost-benefit analysis must be extended so as to incorporate relevant and appropriate measures for environment protection as inherent cost components. It is important to keep in mind that threats to the balance of ecosystems are seen in the advanced countries as a consequence of rapid but inadequately controlled development ("pollution of affluence"), while the disturbances to such balance in the developing world are caused by lack of development ("pollution of poverty"). In view of the need to

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11 *Environmental Impact Assessment: Principles and Procedures*, SCOPE Report 5, International Council of Scientific Unions, Toronto 1975

accelerate development over a widening range of human activities that involves increased resource use, policies for resource development in developing countries must therefore be directed at the appropriate management of forestry resources and timber extraction, aquatic resources, watersheds, water use and water control systems, soil regeneration and land restoration.

As the continued demand for energy fuels, mineral ores and industrial raw materials unavoidably affect the living environment, it is also time to dispense with another conventional distinction, which is between renewable and depletable resources. I would suggest that for practical purposes of resource policies all resources be considered non-renewable. This is necessary to maintain a persistent policy alert in respect to the economic, social and political dangers of ecological overstress and must not be taken to mean as a veto on growth.



# THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS AND DOMESTIC CONSIDERATIONS OF DEEP SEABED MINING\*

John M. MURPHY

Nodules lying on the floor of the deep seabed, contain copper, nickel, cobalt and manganese, and constitute a source of minerals that far overshadows land-based supplies and reserves. Estimates of the size of this resource run into the trillions of tons.

Only about three percent of the total ocean floor area has been surveyed in any detail. Most of this area is located in the Eastern Pacific Ocean, north of the equator, in proximity to the United-States — where most of the companies developing deep seabed technology are based. The most attractive deposits now identified occur in this region and in the South Pacific near Polynesia. However, large areas of the oceans including the Indian ocean where high grade nodules have been found, remain essentially unexplored. The extent of the most attractive known seabed deposits is so large that first-generation commercial ventures — covering roughly the first twenty years of operations — are likely to mine less than five percent of the deposits constituting such mine-sites.

Relative to any other source of minerals we have previously considered exploiting, it is clear that the quantity of deep seabed mineral is potentially staggering. Furthermore, manganese nodules are not, strictly speaking, a depletable resource.

Indications are that nodules are forming continuously at a relatively significant rate. The process, is said to be identical to that for making rock candy. Given a "seed" around which to form,

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\* Presented in a discussion at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Jakarta.

crystals will grow drawing on the sugar or, in the case of nodules, minerals that are dissolved in the surrounding water.

I am addressing myself to a critical issue — one that has been completely obscured in the international debate on deep seabed mining. From any practical standpoint, it is not the seabed minerals themselves that are scarce.

Even at the standard of living enjoyed by the industrialized nations, there are enough manganese nodules to last the entire world for hundreds of years. It is expected that, by the time there is any serious danger of depleting the resource, technological capability to mine the moon or other planets, will have been developed.

The United Nations' resolution declaring the resources of the deep seabed to be the "common heritage of mankind" has masqueraded as an attempt to ensure that a scarce resource is equitably shared among the nations of the world. The problem with this claim is that the resource is not scarce. What is crucially scarce, however, is the knowledge and technological capability necessary for the recovery of these minerals from as deep as three miles below the ocean surface and the ability to process such nodules once recovered.

This knowledge is possessed by certain consortia of United States, Japanese, West German, French, Australian, British, Dutch, Swedish, and Canadian corporations. The knowledge that these technologically sophisticated consortia possess is not generally regarded as "the common heritage of mankind".

The importance of this distinction between the resource itself and the knowledge required to recover the resource cannot be overemphasized. What our adversaries at the United Nations Law of the Sea Conference are demanding, once you get down to basics, is not just their fair share of the resource. This we are willing to provide them. What they are really demanding is a share of the benefits that are gained through the investment of time, resources, and effort on the part of others in gaining the technical expertise and in building the equipment necessary for recovery and processing — without bearing any of the costs themselves. Many have the additional motive of protecting their privileged position, as monopoly producers of these minerals, from competition in the

world market. It is indeed certain that any of the nations so adamantly opposed to deep seabed mining, were they willing to devote resources to seabed nodule recovery and processing, would be welcome members of the mining consortia that have already been formed. It is unreasonable and implausible to argue — as the group of 77 is attempting to argue — that one has been excluded from a rightful share of a world resource simply because that nation is not allowed to share in the benefits unless it bears some of the cost.

The lesser developed nations should recognize that the industrialized world has attained the high standard of living it now enjoys only by the investment of resources, hard work, and the time that it has expended throughout its history to reach this goal. We are fully prepared and committed to help the underdeveloped world reach their goals, but they must recognize that it demands commitment and investment of resources on their part.

Their current abdication of this responsibility and their concomitant claims that we owe them a share of the wealth we have produced, is highly distressing.

The problem may have been best expressed by our special representative at the U.N. Law of the Sea Conference, Ambassador Elliot L. Richardson, in his appearance before the house committee on merchant marine and fisheries, which I chair. During his testimony on July 27, I expressed my feeling that no acceptable treaty would be forthcoming in the near future without some pressure applied to the third world and that the pressure should be of an economic nature. Ambassador Richardson expressed agreement with that statement and elaborated even further by stating:

“There has to be pressure in a sense that the other participants in the conference have to be aware of two things: one is that deep seabed mining will go forward with or without a treaty; the other is that there is no way in which other countries can participate through an international seabed authority in deep seabed mining unless the terms and conditions under which private corporations and consortia contract with the authority are economically viable.”

This point must be emphasized. Private corporations are simply not going to be interested in participating in an international deep seabed mining effort that requires them to give away all their proprietary information, bear all the investment costs, but reap none of the financial benefits. I do not think that a corporate presi-



dent who was to undertake a venture requiring the corporation to give away its trade secrets, its assets, and the service of its employees while receiving nothing in return could expect to keep his job for long. But, this is exactly what the third world is demanding.

It is also imperative that we correct the erroneous impression that deep seabed mining is an initiative being fostered by the United States alone. I would like to set the record straight in this regard.

Admittedly, we do have our own interest at heart. We would like to decrease our dependence on mineral imports — particularly when the sources of such imports may be of uncertain political stability. Of course, new industry benefits us just as it does any other country.

As it is now developing, however, deep seabed mining is truly an international effort. At least eight other nations in the free world are directly involved in development of deep seabed mining through participation in various mining consortia. Furthermore, these consortia draw their investment capital from many more than just the nine nations in which the corporations comprising the consortia are based. In total, there are several dozen nations which are now participating in the development of deep seabed mining in some way. Many of these nations have their own national interest and security in mind as, quite rightly, they should.

The United States currently leads the world in the development of deep seabed mining technology and development of commercial markets for seabed minerals. But, nobody can plausibly argue that we are excluding other nations from the benefits of harvesting these minerals.

This brings me to what I now see as the fundamental impediment to a Law of the Sea Treaty. The respective world views of the industrialized and developing countries and, consequently, the premises on which each bases its negotiations, may be simply too different to be reconcilable.

The industrialized nations are accustomed to working within a free enterprise framework. They accept the premise that one shares in the benefits of society largely to the extent that one shares in the cost. Not only is this considered fair but it is the way that a nation

improves its standard of living — by investing in ventures today that will lead to increased national wealth tomorrow.

The lesser developed nations comprising the third world, on the other hand, do not accept this theory. They believe that they have a birthright to the earth's economic wealth — no matter what nation or nations bore the expense by which that wealth was created. One of the reasons that economic aid to these nations, whether through development loans or outright grants, creates so much resentment is because they really feel that we owe them more, no matter how much is provided for them.

I will not try to claim that I am right and the leaders of the third world are wrong. Certainly they believe that their egalitarian sentiments, largely inspired by their own economic ideologies, are fair and equitable — as firmly as I believe the American free enterprise system, monitored by a government of the people, is just.

The point is that these two sets of beliefs are irreconcilable. They are so basic to each of our ways of life as to make open discussion most difficult.

Many of the scholars who have studied deep seabed mining within the context of the Law of the Sea negotiations have completely missed this point. For the most part, they have proposed complicated schemes for distributing the wealth from the deep seabed in order to make every nation on earth more prosperous than it is now. The intent of these proposals is to make ocean mining compromises acceptable to the third world. Our negotiators have gone far more than half way in attempting to implement some of these compensatory schemes at the conference. Yet, compromise proposals made by the U. S. delegation that included parallel access, extensive technology transfer, and excessive royalty payments to an international authority were flatly refused. Our proposals were, in my opinion, far too generous.

Once we recognize, as the scholars have *not*, the highly irrational nature of the negotiations at the Law of the Sea Conference, we may find that we are in a completely new arena. We may not be able to reason with the underdeveloped nations because our beliefs differ so drastically. If this is true, we are left with an inescapable choice. The industrialized nations can either follow the dictates of the third world or protect their own interest.

There is no question in my mind that the latter is the course we should pursue.

As chairman of the House Committee on merchant marine and fisheries, I have, along with many of my colleagues, strongly urged the Congress and the President of the United States to protect our interest and to avoid capitulation to excessive and unreasonable demands at the Law of the Sea Conference. I think that we should make it abundantly clear to all concerned that we are prepared to go ahead with deep seabed mining with or without a L.O.S.<sup>1</sup> treaty and that, should the conference breakdown permanently, we are prepared to negotiate a series of bilateral or multilateral agreements with those nations who wish to pursue ocean mining.

Whatever the good intentions of the United States and certain other nations, the cleavages between the group of 77 nations, the land-based producers, the industrialized countries and the land-lock nations, make the establishment of an international seabed authority extremely uncertain. We must face the possibility that the Law of the Sea Conference will produce no acceptable treaty.

To strengthen the position of the U.S. delegation in its negotiation with the Third World and to establish a legal format suitable for possible multilateral or bilateral agreements on seabed mining, I have been urging the United States Congress to adopt domestic deep seabed mining legislation to encourage the commencement of commercial mining activity within the next few years.

The Congress must move forward this year with comprehensive legislation for two critical important reasons.

First, a legal framework must be established by legislation, a framework in which the industry can operate and the government can administer.

With respect to the American mining industry, it is imperative that some degree of predictability about its future rights in the ocean be established. Between now and the beginning of commercial recovery on the first few mine sites which will be located in the North Pacific Ocean between Hawaii and the West Coast, the companies must acquire and commit more than \$2.5 billion. To the extent that a L.O.S. treaty could terminate industry's rights under

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<sup>1</sup> Law of the Sea



existing international law, prohibit mining activities, limit production, fix prices, require transference to a new mining site, or raise costs prohibitively, lending institutions will not loan any substantial part of the risk capital needed to move toward commercial operations. The political risks involved in an international agreement must be addressed in legislation so that a reasonable secure investment climate will be created. Only within that climate, will investment companies be willing to loan and mining companies be able to obtain the enormous amounts of capital required for deep oceans operations.

Conversely, our government has virtually no control over the present exploratory and development activity of our ocean mining companies. The U.S. State Department has confirmed the fact that the companies may continue to operate under customary international law within the concept of the freedom of the high seas. Consequently, there is no regulatory framework by which the U.S. or any of its allies may exercise any type of administrative or environmental control over high seas operations. This is an element we will need if we are to mine the seas in an environmentally sound and responsible manner. Therefore, it is imperative that a strong legal framework be established, a framework within which the industry may enjoy some degree of investment security and the government may exercise its normal functions of regulation and administration.

The Legislation that Congressman John Breaux and I have introduced and which has been reported out of two House Committees addresses itself to these requirements. Additionally, our legislation contains a provision on reciprocating states that is designed to encourage our allies to follow our lead and adopt deep seabed mining laws of their own. Our express policy in the Legislation is to prohibit the issuance of any license or permit for ocean mining if such mining conflicts with licenses or permits issued previously by a presidentially designated reciprocating state.

It should also be noted that our Legislation is interim in nature. In other words, the framework established by the Congress will exist only as long as there is no international agreement which is binding upon the United States. Once such an agreement is successfully concluded — if that ever occurs — ocean mining will then be carried out under the structure of the international treaty.

I believe that this is very important to keep in mind because some argue that our legislation will damage the L.O.S. negotiations. This is simply not true as the temporary nature of our measure indicates.

In concluding these remarks, I would like to touch on the question of why, in a humanitarian sense, we must proceed with deep seabed mining. This is the important question on which aspects of ocean policy must ultimately focus. Any policy that fails to take human welfare into account is policy that is empty and useless.

Some feel that no resource in the ocean should be exploited. Others feel that ocean resources should be exploited indiscriminately. Somewhere between these two extremes is a moderate balance that maximizes the human economic benefit derived from ocean resources while protecting the splendor and natural beauty of the ocean environment. Our Legislative approach to deep seabed mining represents, I am convinced, such a balance.

On the economic side, the reason commercial exploitation of these resources has never before been undertaken lies in the historically high cost of producing minerals from the ocean, particularly when compared to the relatively low cost of producing those minerals from abundant landbased ores. However, over the past decade the value of the metals contained in nodules has more than doubled and has risen by 50 percent more than either the U.S. wholesale price index or the International Monetary Fund index of world traded goods.

At the same time, the technological environment, within which efficient ocean mining techniques could be generated, has been greatly improved. This is largely attributable to techniques developed by the rapidly growing offshore oil industry. Also, as ocean mining becomes potentially cheaper, land-based mining is becoming increasingly expensive. This is due both to dramatic declines in ore quality and accessibility and to increased infrastructure costs as more isolated land-based deposits are brought under development.

Additionally, we are moving into a period in which there is a shift from a buyer's to a seller's market for most raw commodities. This greatly increases the probability of stable cartels forming.



Economic theorists traditionally dismiss the possibility of the formation of long-lived cartels. Yet, these same theorists did not foresee the formation of the OPEC cartel in 1973 and have, since that time, repeatedly predicted imminent collapses of that cartel, collapses which we all know have not occurred.

Many land-based producers of minerals are operating at already near monopoly prices — *prima facie* evidence that they already wield considerable market power. One who believes that such producers could not form a cartel is, in my opinion, seriously deluding himself.

Deep seabed mining can restore competition to the world market that would result in lower mineral prices for all. The economic benefit from this would be worldwide and include even those nations most adamantly opposed to an equitable seabed mining structure.

Much of what we are seeing in the confrontation between the industrialized nations and the lesser developed countries is a fundamental difference in the perception of what role is to be played by the United States and its allies in long-range human development. This brings us back to my comments earlier about the knowledge and technological capability necessary for recovery of seabed nodules, and not the nodules themselves, being the true resource. I believe that we should all keep in mind that the oil, gas, minerals, and other resources that we began using about a century ago have been held by the earth for millions of years. What was lacking through all these years of human history was the knowledge required to make use of these resources.

The industrial and technological development that has been undertaken by the United States and others entails learning-by-doing. You do not have to be very intelligent to stoke a furnace with coal or burn oil that you happen to find by digging in your backyard.

You have to be a good deal more intelligent to be able to obtain that oil from beneath the outer continental shelf which is under 200 meters of water. You have to be very intelligent indeed to make synthetic fuels from sea water using solar energy, or separate isotopes of hydrogen from sea water and heat them to 200 million degrees Fahrenheit for the purpose of power generation. The use



of hydrogen isotopes from sea water is a function we expect to be able to perform in the next century — once fusion reactors become operational. These latter two sources of energy, if developed, would last mankind for six to ten billion years. This is as long or longer than the sun itself will last.

In view of this, one should properly view the non-renewable resources that we are now using not as finite wealth that the industrialized world is squandering, but as a fortunate accident of nature that has given us the luxury of time to learn processes that will ultimately bring mankind into a world of truly abundant wealth.

Each new technological project that we undertake is an important part of this learning process. What we learn from deep seabed mining will be far more important in the long-run than the minerals we recover. The knowledge we gain will be beneficial for all people and all nations. This is precisely why it is imperative that the exploration and development of the oceans be strongly encouraged by the world community — and not be politically constrained by an international conference which may be based on questionable premises and irreconcilable positions.

# THE UNITED STATES, JAPAN AND ASIAN SECURITY

Franklin B. WEINSTEIN

It is not without irony that United States-Japan relations in the early months of the Carter Administration have proved to be somewhat rocky. One cannot easily name another U.S. administration that entered office with so firm and explicit a commitment to the cultivation of cooperative U.S.-Japan relations and to the improvement of communication between Washington and Tokyo. It is well known that President Carter, his Assistant for National Security Affairs Zbigniew Brzezinski, and other high officials believe in the importance of treating Japan as a full trilateral partner. These men took office with a sharp awareness of the shortcomings of previous administrations in their handling of relations with Japan and a determination to avoid a recurrence of the kinds of "shocks" that upset those relations in the early 1970s. Yet, U.S.-Japan relations seem to have been jolted, if not shocked, by the Carter Administration's policy pronouncements concerning nuclear energy and U.S. force withdrawals from Korea. Some Japanese have in fact spoken of a "plutonium shock" and a "Korea shock."

About the plutonium issue I shall say little. Washington's attempts to discourage the reprocessing of nuclear fuel and development of the plutonium breeder have brought to light some important differences in the way Japanese and Americans perceive their national interests. Negotiations are currently underway to achieve a policy that will facilitate Japanese efforts to acquire greater independence of energy supplies without obstructing efforts, which serve both American and Japanese interests, to impede the spread of technological capabilities that can lead to proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Korea question is especially troubling because it runs to the heart of American perceptions of their

security interests in East Asia and their expectations as to the kind of contribution Japan should make to the maintenance of regional security. U.S. officials, seeking to explain the new Administration's policy on Korea, have suggested that Washington is seeking some new type of security arrangement for Northeast Asia. Such statements seem only to have increased Japanese anxiety. As an academic specialist on Asian international affairs who is not a member of the government, I cannot presume to say what kinds of arrangements these officials may have in mind. What follows is my own interpretation of how the American commitment to South Korea, and the broader questions of U.S. and Japanese roles in maintaining Asian security, ought to be understood.

## U.S. COMMITMENTS AND ASIAN SECURITY

It is not surprising that questions have arisen concerning the meaning of U.S. security commitments in the post-Vietnam era. The defeat of American-supported governments in Indochina, the virtually complete evacuation of U.S. military forces from Thailand, the growing debate<sup>3</sup> over the future of U.S. bases in the Philippines, and the announced plan for the gradual withdrawal of U.S. ground forces from South Korea have fostered doubts about the determination of the United States to continue playing the kind of security role it has held in Asia since the early 1950s. Many Americans have indeed begun to view their country's Asian security commitments in a new light, but it would be a mistake to interpret this as either a failure of will on the part of the United States or as a loss of interest in the security of Asia. Rather, it is a matter of coming to terms with the changing realities of international politics as we approach the 1980s.

The commitments that constitute the heart of American security policies in Asia were undertaken in the strategic context of the 1950s, which assumed the dominant power of the United States and the implacable hostility of relationships with presumed adversaries, especially with a People's Republic of China perceived as the principal promotor of Soviet interests in Asia. The international system of the post-Vietnam era is marked by a relatively high degree of multipolarity. The reduced capacity of the United States to project its military power unchallenged and the possibilities of



constructive interaction with the Chinese raise questions about a defense policy based on contrary assumptions. It is hard to mobilize public opinion in the United States to support commitments aimed mainly at countering a Chinese threat, when some prominent Americans speak of China as a "de facto ally" and contemplate the possibility of extending military aid to Peking.

Moreover, many U.S. commitments, like the one to Vietnam, probably were never feasible to implement. Most of those commitments were undertaken as a part of a global bargaining process with the Soviet Union. The United States adopted what Hans Morgenthau has called a "collector's approach" to alliances, signing up members and making commitments in the belief that the greater the number of nations it could persuade to be its allies and accept its commitments, the greater its success in competition with the Soviet Union. Many of these commitments, such as the one in Vietnam, were undertaken haphazardly and without agreement on the intrinsic importance of the area concerned or the feasibility of defending it against all dangers. Because U.S. policymakers in the 1950s regarded Communist movements as surrogates for Soviet power, they assumed that any threat would lead to a confrontation with the Soviet Union, with the matter resolved at that level. In the era of massive retaliation and "no more Koreas," Washington made commitments on the assumption that it was unlikely to be called upon to implement them. Few seriously contemplated how the United States might actually conduct limited wars to fulfill those commitments. Nevertheless, American Secretaries of State from Dulles to Kissinger asserted that a failure to meet any one of these commitments would be interpreted as a failure of American will and thus would seriously imperil the credibility of all other commitments. The security structure established by the United States was underlain by the assumption that all commitments were interdependent, the whole chain being no stronger than the weakest commitment.

There is a growing awareness among Americans of the need for greater selectivity in the making and implementation of security commitments. It is now widely believed that commitments requiring counterinsurgency activities by the United States are not viable and should be curtailed. This has clear implications in Southeast Asia, where the principal threat faced by America's remaining allies is that of insurgency. A more discriminating approach to the

implementation of U.S. commitments would in no way endanger the credibility of truly vital commitments, like the one to Japan. On the contrary, such commitments would be strengthened. Reaffirmation of unneeded or unattainable commitments is increasingly recognized as a bluff which in the end adds little to security. Treating all commitments as if they were equal and interdependent in effect weakens those which are truly vital. It not only threatens to dissipate material and psychological resources; it is likely as well to produce overblown rhetoric to justify questionable commitments, thus confusing the public and complicating the task of building a consensus behind those commitments which are genuinely of critical importance.

Rather than clinging to a static defensive posture of seeking to maintain all U.S. commitments merely because they have been made, Americans are increasingly inclined to look at their security commitments with a fresh eye. Where the dangers which once necessitated U.S. commitments have diminished, or the capabilities of allies to provide for their own security have grown. U.S. commitments need to be re-examined. As the conditions underlying certain commitments change, it is natural that those commitments should change too. And there is need for a clearer understanding of the concept of credibility. Credibility does not inhere in the U.S. government's merely saying time and again, "you can trust us," until allied leaders are convinced that the Americans really will keep their word. While I would not dismiss completely the value of solemn pledges as a means of codifying a nation's perception of its interests and creating additional incentives to lend assistance to another country, those pledges are likely to prove viable only so long as the perception of shared interests persists. That is why American commitments to NATO and to Japan are so strong. I believe that even if there were no U.S. treaty commitment to Japan, the United States could be counted on to come to Japan's defense in a crisis because of the deep conviction on the part of the American people that a free, strong Japan is of the utmost importance to the security of the United States itself.

It is also worth noting that as some of the military threats which loomed so large in the past gradually fade, security is likely to be sought increasingly through policies aimed at ensuring sources of raw materials, market outlets, and access to sea lanes. These can much more easily be attained by economic and diplomatic means



than by military ones, which means that military commitments in general may play a somewhat less important role in maintaining security than in the past. The United States, without abandoning its determination to maintain a position of adequate military strength, can and should place greater emphasis in its security policies on economic cooperation with allies and with presumed adversaries as well.

All of this should not be taken to mean that U.S. military commitments in East Asia are no longer important, but it does suggest that they can no longer be viewed as part of a single chain of interdependent and unconditional pledges. Commitments to different countries will have different meanings. Nor is firmness of American will in meeting commitments likely to be such a central issue, as allied nations gain the capacity to do more — militarily, diplomatically, or economically — to ensure their own security in the face of more diffuse, if not diminished, threats. The United States may well become more flexible and discriminating in its approach to security commitments, adjusting the form and degree of each one to fit the new international situation. As already mentioned, this would seem to mean a narrowing of U.S. commitments to Southeast Asia, while the basis for the U.S. commitment to Japan remains even stronger than reaffirmations of American intentions can indicate. The future of the U.S. commitment to the government on Taiwan is, of course, inextricably bound up with the working out of terms for the normalization of Washington's relations with Peking. The biggest question at this point concerns the U.S. commitment to the security of South Korea, and it is this subject to which we now turn.

## THE SECURITY OF KOREA

Two things need to be made clear at the outset. First, what is at issue in Korea is not the American commitment itself, but the form of its implementation. In announcing his decision last March to withdraw U.S. ground forces from South Korea within four to five years, President Carter left no doubt that the United States remains committed to providing whatever level of military presence is needed to deter a North Korean attack. The question, then, concerns a judgement as to the character of the force deemed nece-



ssary to maintain peace on the peninsula. Second, it is inaccurate to assume, as some observers have, that Mr. Carter's decision is nothing more than the fulfillment of a promise he made in order to win votes during the election campaign. It is futile to speculate as to Mr. Carter's "real" motivations, but it is worth noting that his promise, issued early in the campaign, to withdraw U.S. ground forces from Korea within five years, had already been watered down considerably by the latter stages of the campaign, when it became clear that a more conservative stance on foreign policy issues would be more helpful in his contest with Mr. Ford. When Mr. Carter took office, he was committed by his campaign rhetoric only to the withdrawal of U.S. ground forces by some unspecified date; it probably would not have been difficult for him to delay setting any terminal date for the process or to stretch the withdrawal out beyond five years. As indicated by the recently demonstrated unwillingness of the U.S. Congress to endorse Mr. Carter's withdrawal plan, it is not at all clear that this is a politically expedient move for the President.

The essential point is that the strongest case for the gradual withdrawal of U.S. ground forces from South Korea is the one to be made on strategic, not political, grounds. In the present strategic context, taking into account changes in Korea itself and in the international system, there is every reason to believe that U.S. ground forces will be unneeded within five years. Indeed, a strong case can be made that they are superfluous even now, but gradualism is desirable in order to give all parties time to adjust.

Most analysts agree that the military forces of South and North Korea are, overall, in balance. In ground forces the South Koreans have a significant numerical advantage, in addition to superior combat experience and excellent defensive terrain. It is widely agreed that they can repel any ground attack from the north without the assistance of American ground forces; President Park himself confirmed this publicly in August of 1975. Although, as General Singlaub has reported, North Korean firepower had previously been underestimated, it is questionable whether the new figures represent any significant change in the overall balance. It is also important to note that the increased inventories, mainly of tanks now attributed to the North Koreans reflect improved intelligence collection capabilities, not a sudden buildup by the North Koreans. In any case, it is hard to imagine that the South Koreans

have any deficiencies in equipment which could not be remedied within the five-year period designated for the withdrawal of U.S. ground forces.

This line of reasoning leads inexorably to the conclusion that the military justification for the continued presence of U.S. air forces is also diminishing. The Carter Administration has not reached this point in its thinking, and I know of no Administration statements which contradict the view that U.S. air forces should remain in Korea for the indefinite future. This seems a prudent posture for the government to take, given the uneasiness in some quarters about the withdrawal of ground forces. But I believe that it is time to begin thinking about where the process is likely to lead in the long run, and, in so doing, to consider the logic of a complete U.S. withdrawal.

There is no doubt that U.S. air forces play a more important military role in the defense of South Korea than do U.S. ground forces. It is generally acknowledged that without U.S. support to Seoul, North Korea has a substantial quantitative advantage in air capabilities, though the margin of superiority shrinks considerably when qualitative factors are taken into consideration. The gap is being narrowed further as South Korea procures additional F-4s and F-5Es, both of which are superior to any aircraft possessed by the North Koreans. U.S. tactical air support would be of importance to the South Koreans in any hostilities initiated by North Korea. Yet there is no reason to assume that this must always be so. Augmentation of South Korea's air defence capabilities to a level of parity with the north is presumably possible at some level of expenditures. Indeed, give the economic vitality of South Korea, it is hard to imagine that the South Koreans will not be able to attain parity with the North Korean air forces within some reasonable period of time — say, five to eight years. When South Korean air forces are the equal of North Korea's, there will be no military justification for the continued presence of U.S. forces.

Of course, many of those who would acknowledge that the military justification for the presence of U.S. forces in Korea is diminishing argue that the real importance of those forces is political. By serving as a tripwire to ensure immediate U.S. involvement, these troops are said to deter a North Korean invasion. Withdrawing those forces, even if they are superfluous from a mili-



tary standpoint, allegedly would have a dangerous psychological impact on the South Koreans and could invite North Korean aggression. A U.S. withdrawal, if interpreted by Seoul as a critical weakening of the U.S. commitment, could lead South Korea to undertake some irresponsible action, such as seeking its own nuclear weapons capability.

There is no doubt that the political justification for a U.S. presence is stronger than the military rationale, but I believe there is need for substantial rethinking of the reasoning behind that political justification. The first question to be asked is whether an indefinite U.S. military presence on the peninsula is in fact indispensable to deterrence of a North Korean attack. The presence of U.S. forces has one overriding political purpose: it makes U.S. intervention in the event of hostilities virtually automatic. That U.S. ground forces stationed just below the DMZ serve this role is clear beyond doubt; the desire to avoid such automatic involvement is reportedly one reason for the Carter Administration's decision to withdraw those forces. But it is not clear that removing ground forces significantly diminishes the tripwire effect. Although air forces positioned farther south theoretically could be held in reserve during the early stages of hostilities, in reality it would be extremely hard to keep them out. Even if U.S. air forces were not assaulted by enemy airplanes, troops, or saboteurs, there would be enormous pressure on them to intervene immediately in order to convince the aggressors of the hopelessness of their cause. Moreover, U.S. policymakers would fear that any failure to respond to the attack might be construed as a retreat.

There is no reason for the United States to intervene automatically on behalf of those who are fully capable of defending themselves without the help of U.S. forces. In calculating the forces needed for deterrence, the central fact is that the South Koreans are becoming strong enough to inflict unacceptable losses on any invading North Korean force. South Korea is no South Vietnam; nor is it even remotely comparable to the weak South Korean state of 1950. As the impressive strength of South Korea becomes clear, so should Seoul's capacity, on its own, to deter a North Korean attack. A gradual phased U.S. withdrawal might well be made contingent on the maintenance of a rough balance between North and South Korea. If the announcement of plans for a gradual U.S. withdrawal should lead to a major North Korean



buildup, the timetable can always be revised. There is no more reason to view planned withdrawals as irrevocable than to regard past commitments of forces as fixed in concrete.

Moreover, even after the completion of a U.S. withdrawal, the United States would still have to be considered as an element in the calculus of deterrence. The American commitment would remain in force, providing an additional measure of overkill beyond the retaliatory capabilities of the South Koreans themselves. There is, after all, nothing in the security treaty requiring the presence of U.S. troops as a manifestation of the commitment. A U.S. response would no longer be automatic, but it could hardly be discounted by the North Koreans. Air forces earmarked for Korea would be positioned at sea and at U.S. bases in the Pacific. A U.S. presence close to, but not in, Korea would serve not only to reinforce the deterrent capabilities of the South Koreans but to demonstrate that Washington remains committed to intervene in the unlikely event that Moscow or Peking should decide to do so on North Korea's behalf.

It is, of course, conceivable that the South Koreans might need U.S. help to repel a North Korean invasion, even one unaided by Moscow or Peking, but it is very unlikely. Why, then, make U.S. intervention automatic? Why not see whether the South Koreans can handle the situation without U.S. intervention? Cold War logic led many Americans to conclude that the United States should commit itself to the defense of as many allies as possible because only American military power could deter attacks by Communist nations against their neighbors. It is time to shed such outmoded assumptions and adjust to the new strategic context. Allies like South Korea that are approaching the day when they will no longer need the automatic U.S. intervention implied by a U.S. military presence should be permitted, indeed encouraged, to stand on their own to the maximum extent possible. It is in the interests of the United States to keep its options open and to hold military intervention as a last resort, limited to those situations in which it is manifestly required.

What about the danger that the South Koreans might respond to a U.S. withdrawal by undertaking some drastic action, like seeking their own nuclear weapons? Would the United States retain enough leverage to dissuade Seoul from such a course? As in the

discussion of deterrence, the question is — how much is enough? The U.S. commitment might be worth less to the South Koreans than before, but, if one can believe what the South Koreans themselves say, it would still be of vital importance. Though they could no longer count on automatic U.S. intervention in case of a North Korean attack, they could still be assured of U.S. intervention in the event of Soviet or Chinese involvement, and there would still be a possibility, if no longer a certainty, of U.S. intervention even against the North Koreans alone. One may assume that the unwillingness of the Chinese and Soviets to back a new North Korean invasion is at least partly related to their expectation that the United States would support the South Koreans. It would be highly irrational for Seoul to sacrifice this still valuable U.S. commitment for nuclear weapons.

Even if Seoul were to dismiss the U.S. security commitment as worthless, a decision to go nuclear would incur some major costs. If it were known that the South Koreans were moving toward nuclear weapons in defiance of the United States and at the sacrifice of any U.S. commitment whatever, this could provoke a pre-emptive attack by an alarmed North Korea. A nuclear decision by Seoul could lead to the suspension of U.S. supplies of enriched uranium, which would deal a crippling blow to South Korea's nuclear power program. There are economic levers which the Japanese might bring to bear. Moreover, the South Koreans would face major technical obstacles to development of an effective nuclear weapon, especially if the present agreement among nuclear supplier nations to refrain from selling reprocessing technology remains in effect. This is not to rule out the possibility of Seoul's going nuclear. But we should appreciate the fact that while it may be in South Korea's interests to use, subtly, the threat to go nuclear as a means of bargaining for retention of U.S. forces or military aid, an actual decision to develop such weapons would be a costly and risky move that could well diminish, rather than increase, South Korea's security.

Besides increasing American flexibility, the gradual phased withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea would have several other important benefits. The withdrawal of U.S. forces may well facilitate the building of a consensus in this country behind a redefined commitment to Seoul. Growing numbers of Americans balk at committing U.S. forces and funds to automatic invol-



vement on behalf of a regime that denies its citizens the human rights cherished by Americans and allegedly bribes U.S. officials in order to win their political support. Withdrawal of U.S. forces would reduce America's feeling of responsibility for a government increasingly perceived as repressive and corrupt.

If it were understood that U.S. intervention is not automatic, except in the unlikely event of Soviet or Chinese intervention, it would probably be easier for the American people to support this narrowed commitment. Though more limited in scope, such a commitment would have its credibility enhanced by the knowledge that it is backed by a political consensus. Besides, a decline in the level of U.S. support for South Korea is likely to bring a corresponding reduction of criticism of Seoul by Americans. South Korean officials resent what they regard as U.S. interference in their country's domestic affairs, but they understand that it is the presence of U.S. forces and U.S. aid that gives many Americans the feeling that they have a right, even an obligation, to protest against Seoul's domestic policies. Though Seoul may object initially to any plan leading toward a complete withdrawal, in the long run a more self-reliant South Korea, less open to American criticism of its domestic policies, might actually find its relations with the United States smoother.

In fact, maintaining U.S. forces in South Korea beyond the time when they are really needed may have a number of damaging results for the Koreans. Some people argue for continuation of the U.S. military presence in Korea to bolster the South Koreans psychologically. But the problem is cyclical: whatever "psychological inferiority" the South Koreans may feel vis-a-vis the north will only be perpetuated by a continued U.S. presence. To the extent that the South Koreans do feel psychologically dependent on the United States, this can be overcome only by showing that they can in fact stand without U.S. support. Continuing to provide the symbolic "crutch" represented by U.S. forces only deepens the psychological inferiority which it is allegedly intended to alleviate. If it is made clear that the withdrawal of U.S. forces is undertaken neither as an abandonment of the Koreans nor as a punitive measure but as a vote of confidence in Seoul's ability to defend itself, this may help to break the psychological dependence of the South Koreans on the United States. From the standpoint of the United States, a withdrawal from South Korea may be viewed not



as a sign of weakness but as evidence of a successful policy. One of the main goals of U.S. commitments, presumably, has been to help strengthen our allies so that they might be able to defend themselves. We could be bold enough to recognize a success as such.

The costs of perpetuating a dependence that need not exist are even clearer if one considers that it plays into the hands of Pyongyang. The U.S. military presence in Korea is easily exploited by the North Koreans as a psychological weapon; it causes considerable embarrassment and frustration for South Korean youth. It serves to buttress the North Koreans' claim to the mantle of Korean nationalism and their characterization of the southern regime as a mere puppet of the United States. Pyongyang can argue to its own populace and to receptive audiences in the Third World that the Seoul government would collapse if American military support were withdrawn.

Why not deprive Pyongyang of this argument? Once American forces have withdrawn and South Korea continues to thrive, Seoul's standing among Third World nations is likely to rise. More important, the continued viability of South Korea after the departure of the Americans, together with Pyongyang's perception that Seoul's military power makes the costs of invasion unacceptably high, may lead the North Koreans to accept the existence of the South Korean state and to begin moving toward some sort of *modus vivendi* with Seoul. So long as the South Koreans remain clearly dependent for their security on the United States, as manifested by the American military presence, it will always be easier for Pyongyang to dismiss Seoul as an American puppet than to come to terms with the reality of the southern state.

Perhaps the ultimate reason for withdrawing unneeded U.S. forces from Korea is that the additional overkill which these forces represent is almost certainly purchased at the sacrifice of opportunities to develop relationships with Pyongyang which might ease tensions and reduce whatever incentive there may be for the North Koreans to attack the south. These opportunity costs are impossible to calculate, for no one can be sure what possibilities might be opened by a termination of the U.S. military presence. Nor can we be certain that the retention of U.S. forces rules out any chance of progress. But it is reasonable to assume that these forces pose an obstacle to any significant relationship between Washington and

Pyongyang and impede normalization of relations between the two Koreas as well. Even progress toward a total U.S. withdrawal by some designated date might help open the way for negotiations. Though no one can guarantee a positive response from Pyongyang, announcement of such a plan would at least make it harder for the North Koreans to refuse to enter discussions with the south. And, as already suggested, the survival of South Korea following a U.S. withdrawal would bring some pressure to bear on Pyongyang to accept South Korea as a reality that will not disappear.

The Japanese have generally put more emphasis than Americans on the need to develop relationships with North Korea as a first step toward a long-term solution of the Korean problem. Even if the prospects of success are uncertain, these relationships represent the best hope for such a solution. The assumption is that if Pyongyang has economic and diplomatic ties with countries like the United States and Japan, the North Koreans will acquire a greater stake in maintaining peace. When going to war means jeopardizing a host of beneficial economic relationships, Pyongyang is more likely to calculate that the costs of war are too high.

Some may think it unrealistic to view such relationships as a basis for security. The real danger, however, is not that people will expect too much of these relationships but too little; an over-emphasis on military commitments as the basis of security may prevent any real effort to test the deterrent potential of other means.

Japan has already begun the process of building relationships with North Korea by developing modest economic ties with Pyongyang. For its part, the United States might begin by relaxing its trade embargo on North Korea and encouraging exploratory economic contacts. Some move toward diplomatic relations also seems in order. Some Japanese leaders have urged unilateral recognition of Pyongyang by Tokyo and Washington. This ought to be considered. Diplomatic ties would not only serve to draw Pyongyang out of its isolation; as a Washington official noted, they would enable us to improve our intelligence on North Korea and develop better means of communicating with Pyongyang in a crisis. They might also enhance the development of economic relations which could help to stabilize North Korea's economy and make the country less dependent on Moscow and Peking.



Obviously, cross-recognition, in which the Communist powers establish relations with Seoul as we do with Pyongyang, would be the preferred course. For that matter, many would have preferred to make the withdrawal of U.S. ground forces contingent on some move by Pyongyang to ease tensions between the two Koreas. The problem is that insistence on such preconditions is likely to mean perpetuation of the status quo. Moscow and Peking may well recognize Seoul after Tokyo and Washington have taken the lead by establishing ties with Pyongyang. The Soviets already have fragmentary unofficial relations with South Korea. The central point, however, is that even in the absence of reciprocity, neither the withdrawal of ground forces nor steps toward the establishment of relations with North Korea need be narrowly viewed as a concession to the Communists which must be balanced by some concession on their part. In the case of force withdrawals, insistence on a quid pro quo tends to undermine the rationale that the forces are being withdrawn mainly because they have become superfluous. As indicated above, economic and diplomatic ties with Pyongyang are useful in themselves for both sides. The promised benefits are not significantly diminished by the absence of reciprocal relationships between the Communist powers and Seoul.

Consideration must, of course, be given to the impact on Seoul of any unilateral move toward relations with Pyongyang. U.S. policy has been to rule out any talks with the North Koreans unless Seoul's representatives are in attendance. One may assume that the South Koreans' initial reaction to any departure from this policy would be one of alarm, but there is little justification for such concern. There is no reason to think that U.S. or Japanese relations with Pyongyang would lead to any diminution in relations which they or other countries maintain with South Korea; Seoul's position is in no way analogous to that of Taipei. The South Koreans should be further reassured by the knowledge that improved U.S.-North Korean relations may prove a restraining force on Pyongyang. This could well be formalized at the outset by coupling the establishment of diplomatic relations with a North Korean pledge that, although both Koreas may feel they have a "right" to use any means at hand to unify the country, the use of force in resolving the conflict is not contemplated. If the North Koreans are unwilling to make such a pledge directly to the United States, it could be made indirectly through a forum of Pyongyang's choosing.



There are obviously limits to what the United States and Japan can do to help bring about the normalization of relations between the two Koreas. A withdrawal of U.S. forces would at least remove one source of tension. Such a move could well stimulate both sides to constructive action, for each could, in some sense, claim the U.S. withdrawal as a "victory." Seoul could point to the departure of the Americans as evidence of South Korea's strength and independence; Pyongyang could celebrate fulfillment of one of its stated long-term ambitions. The establishment of economic and diplomatic relations between Washington and Pyongyang would help to create a conciliatory climate conducive to negotiations between the two Koreas.

One cannot, of course, guarantee that any of these potential benefits will be realized. It is always easy to argue that in the interests of maintaining "stability," no changes should be undertaken without reciprocity. But this is, in my view, a short-sighted view of stability. In the long-run, stability on the peninsula is impossible without the establishment of some *modus vivendi* between the two Koreas, and progress toward that end is unlikely unless one side takes the initiative. How far the Carter Administration is prepared to go in that direction remains uncertain. The Administration has, however, made clear its view that any changes in U.S. policy should be carried out in consultation with both Seoul and Tokyo. Satisfactory consultation is in practice difficult to achieve. Indeed, there is already some evidence of dissatisfaction among Japanese because the Carter Administration has made the basic decision to withdraw ground forces in four to five years without consulting its allies. Some have suggested that there is little left on which to consult. In Japan's case, however, the issue is complicated by the fact that, as reported in the press, at the time of Vice President Mondale's visit to Tokyo shortly after the inauguration, Japanese officials indicated that they did not wish to be consulted on the timing of the withdrawal. This reticence on Japan's part presumably reflected not only a concern that Seoul might object to Tokyo's involvement in these decisions but a fear that consultations on withdrawals from Korea might be exploited by U.S. officials as an opportunity to press Japan to make a greater contribution to regional security.

## JAPAN'S ROLE IN MAINTAINING SECURITY: FALLACIES OF BURDEN SHARING

Even if the United States were not committed to the withdrawal of its ground forces from Korea, the Japanese would have to confront a significant feeling among Americans that Japan, like other U.S. allies, should do more to provide for its own security and for that of the region. Criticism of Japan's "free ride" and demands that Japan assume a greater share of the defense burden are longstanding. Why, many Americans ask, should the United States pay the costs of defending nations that are unwilling to make the maximum sacrifice for their own security? The viability of the U.S. commitment to Japan, it is sometimes argued, depends on the determination of the Japanese to defend themselves. The United States may not be prepared to risk the holocaust of nuclear war in order to protect people who are unwilling to fight in their own defense. An equally important part of the case for greater burden sharing resides in the presumed lightening of the load on the American taxpayer. The political appeal of this argument, always considerable, becomes almost irresistible when the ally, like Japan, is an economic power whose products often compete directly with American goods.

The idea of burden sharing has dominated U.S. thinking about Japan's security role. There are, in my view, several major fallacies in the way in which the concept of burden sharing has been applied to Japan. First, it is a mistake to link the viability of the U.S. commitment to the determination of the Japanese to defend themselves, as manifested by increased burden sharing. This mistaken linkage reflects in part a misinterpretation of the meaning of Japan's reluctance to play a more substantial military role. While economic motivations are by no means absent, it would be inaccurate to dismiss Japanese pacifism as a mere pretext for shirking an unwanted burden. The significance of the factors which differentiate Japan from other U.S. allies should not be underestimated. Increased burden sharing by Japan thus ought to be considered irrelevant to the viability of the U.S. commitment. The central reason for defending Japan is the country's unquestioned importance to the United States in strategic and economic terms. So long as they wish American protection, the Japanese should be able to count on the United States to defend Japan whether or not



they are prepared to mount a major defense buildup in their own behalf.

Moreover, it is necessary to distinguish between criticism of Japan for not carrying its share of the load and real doubts among Americans as to whether Japan is worth defending. Although Americans may voice resentment at seeing Japan prosper without having to carry a heavier military burden, this does not mean that they would urge abandonment of the commitment simply because Japan is not spending more on defense.

The second fallacy of burden sharing lies in the assumption that a modest expansion of Japanese military capabilities would necessarily increase Japan's security and reduce dependence on the United States. A minor increment to Japan's defense forces may be taken as an earnest of Japan's willingness to pay for its own defense, but what precisely would it contribute to Japan's security? If Japan were to play more than a minor role, the Self Defense Forces would have to be expanded far beyond the level urged by advocates of burden sharing. The question, therefore, is whether the marginal contribution which Japanese forces or Japanese aid might make — in both military and psychological terms — would be commensurate with the costs that might be incurred. These potential costs would include: stimulating compensatory buildups by the Communist nations, thus generating pressures for further Japanese military development and possibly inhibiting potential areas of cooperation; jeopardizing Japan's important economic relationships with its non-Communist Asian neighbors which may grow fearful that the process of military development in Japan, once it picks up momentum, will not be easily slowed; and antagonizing Japanese public opinion which seems finally to have accepted the SDF, so long as its role and costs remain limited. If burden sharing is pushed too hard, it could even inspire a wave of anti-Americanism that would endanger the foundations of the U.S.-Japanese alliance. Thus, Japan's acquisition of a minor regional role in the name of burden sharing could well result in a net diminution of security for Japan and for the United States.

The third fallacy of burden sharing resides in the assumption that the burden can accurately be measured by the size of a country's armed forces and defense expenditures. The burden of defense and security should not be defined so narrowly. To begin



with, the Japanese feel that the substantial economic aid they provide to other Asian countries, though it serves a variety of purposes, does contribute to regional security. The military bases which Japan makes available to the United States represent an extremely important contribution to American defense needs. If the United States should withdraw its air forces from South Korea during the next decade, the bases in Japan may become even more important. Although the Japanese derive some economic benefit from the U.S. presence they incur considerable financial costs. More difficult to gauge, but no less important, are the substantial political costs, specifically the infringement on sovereignty inherent in the bases and the tensions which sometimes arise between the bases and the surrounding community.

Rarely is it noted that a nation can contribute to security by not doing certain things. Japan helps to promote stability in East Asia by not rearming more rapidly. If Japan were to acquire a military role in the region, this could not only enflame anti-Japanese feelings but could create an atmosphere of tension that might jeopardize American interest as well. It is important to recognize that by limiting their own rearmament and relying on the United States to deter potential aggression against Japan, the Japanese are paying a certain cost in the form of the risk they take. This cost is perceived as modest, because the risk is low, given the remoteness of the threats to Japan and the reliability of the U.S. commitment. But there is still some risk which ought to be calculated as part of the burden borne by the Japanese.

Finally, Japan makes a contribution to security by presenting itself as a model of a state which has acquired great power status without becoming highly militarized. In itself, Japan's example will not drastically change the attitudes of other nations, but it is a step in the right direction. Rather than undertaking military development that would make at best a marginal contribution to security, Japan can do more to foster stability in Asia by developing its political and economic relations with potential adversary nations, without, of course, abandoning the security treaty with the United States. Japan's economic relations with North Korea and its developing relationship with Vietnam represent important bridges to countries which Washington remains reluctant to approach. Because their military capabilities are so limited, the Japanese may feel that they must make greater use than other nations of eco-

conomic and diplomatic levers for maintaining their security. Reliance on such non-military instruments ought to be encouraged; hopefully, other nations may come to place greater faith in them as well.

The foregoing critique of burden sharing should not be taken to suggest that there is no possible justification for an increased defense effort by Japan. Changes in the international environment may at some point dictate accelerated development of the SDF's capabilities. Even now qualitative improvement in particular areas may be appropriate. For example, a reasonably strong case can be made for improvement of Japan's intelligence-gathering capabilities, though some of these needs might be met through the improvement of arrangements with the United States for sharing of intelligence data, including selected raw data which reliance on satellite photography has made less risky to share. This would give Tokyo the longest possible warning time in which to bring to bear all the non-military means at its disposal to avoid the actual outbreak of hostilities or, in the event of failure, to ensure the realization of the U.S. commitment. Japan might also contribute more to the maintenance of the U.S. bases, especially when doing so creates jobs for Japanese. The central point is that the SDF ought to be developed within the country's constitutional limitations at a pace reflecting Japan's own defense needs as perceived by the Japanese people, not as a meaningless gesture of burden sharing in response to pressure from the United States.

Whatever the Japanese may decide, it is to be hoped that the United States will refrain from pressing Japan into an unwanted military role in the name of a misguided conception of burden sharing. Basic to Japan's security and to the preservation of U.S. security interests in East Asia, is a high degree of understanding between the two countries, embracing political and economic concerns, that will make manifest to both sides the importance of the interests they share. Such an understanding can be sustained far more easily if each country's security policies have broad national support. The United States can help the Japanese government build public support for the U.S. — Japan security relationship by removing irritants wherever possible. This means making it unmistakably clear that the U.S. commitment is not contingent on any increased burden sharing by Japan.

Japan, as a major power without the military attributes usually

associated with such status, is in a position to make a virtually unique contribution to the creation of a peaceful world order. Confidence in the U.S. commitment is vital to the maintenance of Japan's non-military posture, but emphasis on burden sharing tends to make that commitment seem conditional. Rather than pressing the Japanese for military contributions which are likely to prove only marginally useful, if not redundant or actually counter-productive, it would seem wiser to encourage Japan to make the kind of contribution to peace and security which it alone among the major powers can make.



# CHRONICLES

AUGUST 1977

## Internal Affairs

The Chief of Staff of the Command for the Restoration of Order and Security, Admiral Sudomo said in Jakarta on August 1, 1977 that:

1. The Armed Forces (ABRI) will take stern measures against those who disturb the national order and stability;
2. The students' actions of blocking and preventing the city buses from operating will not be tolerated;
3. His meeting with Inspector Generals from many Departments was concerning the execution of the Opstib operations (Operation Order) and participation of the Inspector Generals in them;
4. The operation in the departments is to be focused on the issues of tender and irregularities within the bureaucracy.

In the opening of the LNG (Liquified Natural Gas) Refinery of Badak in Bontang, East Kalimantan (on August 1), President Soeharto stated that to build the project, Indonesia got a loan of US\$ 680 million and within 12 years the sum to be paid back will amount to US\$ 980 million. The product for export during 20 years will reach a total of US\$ 7,7 billion. He further reiterated that Indonesia's loans from other countries are used for fruitful purposes and can be accounted for.

On August 2, a meeting of the National Economic Stabilization Council was held. Following the meeting, Information Minister Mashuri stated that: the amount of money circulating until the end of the first trimester had increased from Rp. 1.809 billion to Rp. 1.891 billion; the total sum of deposits increased from Rp. 630,5 billion to Rp. 644,2 billion during the first semester; the total sum of tabanas (national savings) increased from Rp. 116,7 billion to Rp. 130,4 billion.

On August 1, President Soeharto opened the capital market in Indonesia; one that enables the people to own PT Danareksa cer-

tificated for the first time. On this occasion the President said that the people should be given the opportunity to own shares of companies and industries operating in the capital market. He pointed out that this was one step ahead in the building of a "family economy" as envisaged in article 33 of the 45 Constitution.

The President said in the state address on August 16 that the aim of the New Order is to uphold democracy which implies the implementation and stabilization of the mechanism of national leadership based on the 45 Constitution. He added that the allegations towards the government which stressed the absence of freedom of expressing ones opinion, and the absence of democracy, is indeed a sign of democracy. The President announced the release of the A group detainees of the Communist abortive coup of 30 September, at the latest in 1978; the 10,000 detainees of the B group will be released in 1977 and in 1978, the release of 10,000 more; the remaining in 1979. His final comment was on development in Indonesia. "It is based" he said, "on the trilogy of development which comprises stability, economic growth and equality of social justice".

At the Department of Defence and Security on 17 August (Indonesia's Independence day), the Minister of Defence and Security General Panggabean stated that ABRI (The Armed Forces) would take severe measures on any person or group that willfully attempts to jeopardize the national stability, and that there were certain political groups trying to manipulate the discontentment of the people in order to aggravate situations before the Meeting of the Members of Parliament. He later referred to Asia's security condition as critical.

At the commemoration of Nuzul Qur'an at Mesjid Istiqlal, President Soeharto said that Opstib (Operation Order) could produce good results only if the society gives its full support. He also said that entrepreneurs should rid themselves of the bad habit of accepting gifts and bribes, that the people should abandon luxurious life styles that could lead the nation to its destruction, and live moderately.

### International Relations

From the 8-14 of August, a Press Conference between the Indonesian Journalist Association (PWI) and the Japanese Journalist

Association (NSK) was held in Jakarta. It discussed the role of the Japanese Press in the development of the Press as a whole in the developing countries; and cooperation between the Indonesian and Japanese journalists especially in the field of education and training.

PM Takeo Fukuda together with a delegation were in Indonesia on 12-14 August for official talks with the Indonesian government concerning economics, cultural exchange, cooperation in agricultural development, health and socio-economic infrastructures in Indonesia.

For two days in August (25-27) both Indonesian and Siamese Naval Forces held joint exercises in the Java Sea. They were headed by Commander of the West Esquadron, Rear Admiral of the Naval Force Adang Safaat and as deputy was Colonel Manoj from Thailand's Naval Force.

## SEPTEMBER 1977

### Internal Affairs

The Minister of Defence and Security, General M. Panggabean said to newsmen in Jakarta on September 3 that the Armed Forces support the Operation Order (Opstib) and actively participate in it. And he added that the Armed Forces and the people (including the students) form one unity which is in accordance with the doctrine of the overall people's defence. Hence there should not be a gap between the Armed Forces and students.

The second territorial Defence Commander, Lieutenant General Widodo said to cadres of GMNI (the Indonesian Nationalist Student Association) in Kaliurang on September 4 that:

1. A true student's movement should be motivated from within, positive and constructive in nature, to safeguard national resilience and stability;
2. The restlessness of the students was due to the fact that they were very much affected by the vision of their intellectual or professional role;
3. A harsh attitude of those considering themselves as intellectuals is to a certain extent acceptable, but the right conscience and



the awareness of their rights, duty and responsibility as a member of the society should not be disregarded.

The Chief of Kopkamtib (Command for the Restoration of Security and Order) Admiral Sudomo said to newsmen in Jakarta on September 6, 1977 that the anti-graft campaign of Opstib (Operation Order) began by the uprooting of corruption at the lowest level for it had direct effects on the public. The uprooting of illegal levies is not only aimed at detecting irregularities but also, at revitalizing and at refunctioning the government's apparatus and promoting people's discipline.

The Chief of Kopkamtib Admiral Sudomo said in Jakarta on September 9 that the Operation Order (Opstib) must succeed and cannot back out despite the obstacles faced. Any practice of illegal levies is due to the mental attitude of officials and the public who want to reach their own personal aims by using all means and taking advantage of the ineffective control system. He said further that the Opstib is applied to government officials of all levels.

Following the meeting of the National Economic Stabilization Council on September 20, Information Minister Mashuri told newsmen that:

1. The meeting decided that loans received under the Bimas (mass guidance) programme by non-farmers had to be repaid;
2. The farmers would be freed from repaying their credits owing to the complete destruction of their farms during the last cultivation season;
3. The president had provided guidelines for creating new order in the salt trade by determining the floor and the ceiling prices of salt.

Chief of Kopkamtib (Command of the Restoration of Security and Order) Admiral Sudomo said to newsmen in Jakarta on September 24 that: university students can do whatever they like including criticizing the government provided it is conducted on campus and not in places which might influence the public. He pointed out that for activities like "kebebasan mimbar" (academic freedom) no police permission is needed. Sudomo stated that the actions of the eight university students who set up a DPRS (a Provisional House) on September 13, 1977, were against the law. He reiterated further, that Kopkamtib will take measures against

university students. Sudomo mentioned three types of measures, namely persuasive, educative and finally repressive measures, according to the existing law.

The Chief of Kopkamtib Admiral Sudomo said in Jakarta on September 27, that President Soeharto had instructed him that the Opstib anti-graft campaign should emphasize on encouraging the controlling agencies in the Government departments and regional administration to make them function more effectively. He also said that the regional administration and Laksusda (Regional Special Operational Command) were authorized to eliminate malpractices. Finally the admiral said that people could send their letters to Opstib through P.O. Box 999 to report malpractices.

### International Relations

The Foreign Information Director of the Department of Foreign Affairs stated in Jakarta on 1 September that Indonesia regrets the incident of the lowering of the Indonesian flag in Tuebingen and that it would not in any case rupture the friendly relations and cooperation between Indonesia and West Germany; the government of West Germany will take stern measures towards any attempts or activities aimed towards injuring the good relations between the two countries.

President Soeharto said in Jakarta on 3 September that in developing and making concrete cooperation between the EEC and ASEAN, the peace and well-being of the world would become sounder. He also said that the dialogue held between the EEC and ASEAN will lessen the gap between the developed and the developing countries.

Foreign Minister Adam Malik told newsmen in Jakarta on 3 September that Indonesia should step up diplomatic relations in Africa. He said further that normalization of Indonesia-PRC relationship will be realized in time. He also said that the release of 10,000 communist detainees of the abortive G. 30 September coup has proven that Indonesia upholds human rights.

Trade Minister Radius Prawiro said in Jakarta on September 11 that the US-ASEAN dialogue is of historic value. The US has promised to facilitate the investment procedure in ASEAN coun-

tries and will reconsider the structure of OPIC (Overseas Private Investment Cooperation) and its foreign capital policy.

The Chief of Staff of the Malaysian Armed Forces, General Tan Sri Ibrahim said to newsmen in Jakarta on September 28 that military cooperation between Indonesia and Malaysia is very gratifying. He said further that there is no intention among the ASEAN countries to establish a military pact. He said, however, that the ASEAN nations were still working towards achieving standardization of arms among their countries.



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The Indonesian Quarterly is a medium for the views, research findings and evaluations of scholars, statesmen and creative thinkers in both national and international forum on Indonesia and other related issues, to promote better understanding of the current Indonesian situation and its problems.

Published :  
January, April, July, October

Banker :  
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Jalan Kebon Sirih 66 - 70  
Jakarta Pusat, INDONESIA

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